Overcoming Path Dependence: The Quality of Civilian Control of the Military in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia

Abstract

Theorists of civil-military relations have for long tried to identify the specific factors that lead to weak civilian control of the armed forces in some countries and very strong oversight regimes in others. While some authors highlight the importance of structural factors (such as the level of economic modernization), others point to the crucial role of personal agency (i.e., the quality and characteristics of leadership). Obviously, some form of interplay between structure and agency does occur, but the precise patterns of this relationship have rarely been explored. This article analyses the overall strong, yet institutionally volatile state of civilian control in post-authoritarian Indonesia, and evaluates the role of structural and agency-related factors in this outcome. It concludes that Indonesia has broken its supposed path dependence in several historical, economic and political areas, suggesting that post-1998 actions by political leaders and elite groups have played a more significant role in shaping the new civil-military relationship than commonly thought.

Constitutional Politics in Southeast Asia: From Contestation to Constitutionalism?

“…Constitutional amendments since 2004 have ended military representations in parliaments and active military members may no longer hold cabinet positions, making space for civilian institutions to mature. 59 As a result, constitutionalism and democracy have deepened in Indonesia, though the military has still not been held accountable for human rights violations in West Papua. 60 In a number of other states in the region, however, the military has taken on a distinct political role that has prevented constitutionalism from truly taking root.…”

Democratization and Civilian Control in Asia

“…While one may rightly view the democratization of Indonesia as a mixed success (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2010), it is the only country in Southeast Asia that has seen a stabilization of its democratic institutions in the past ten years. Furthermore, the democratic regimes' ability to produce and maintain public support and civilian consensus on the need to keep the military out of politics has increasingly marginalized the armed forces from the center of power (Mietzner, 2011a).…”

“…For the past ten years or so the military has been willing to accept its subordination to civil power. At the same time, however, key reforms such as the restructuring of the military's territorial command structure and the abolishment of the business activities of military units and individual soldiers have slowed down and the institutionalization of civilian control mechanisms remains unfinished (Mietzner, 2011a(Mietzner, , 2011b.…”

The Parliament and Cooperative Oversight of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Why Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia is Stable but Still in Transition

“…Commander (Mietzner, 2011). The Ministry of Defense is the main defense institution in the executive branch but remains dominated by retired/active military personnel and due to its overlapping authority with the TNI Commander it is also unable to play an effective role in asserting civilian control over defense organization and defense policymaking (Gunawan, 2017a).…”