Origins of Soviet Counterinsurgency

Timing Is Everything

“…The logic of Mylonas’s argument and the conventional wisdom among Poland specialists would suggest that Poland’s far more inhumane postwar tools of ethnic homogenization were the inevitable consequence of a much more serious Ukrainian threat. It is true of course that there was a contingent of Ukrainian nationalists (often affiliated with the OUN–UPA) who had collaborated with Nazi administrators in the hopes of securing German support for their own nationalist ambitions (see, for example, Statiev, 2010). These Ukrainian nationalists also waged their own violent campaigns against ethnic Poles in the latter stages of the war and continuing after the end of official hostilities.…”

An Epidemic Model of Violence and Public Support in Civil War

“…As the prospect of German defeat became more apparent in 1943, the local population gradually became polarized between pro- and anti-Soviet elements (Statiev, 2010: 78–79). Although nationalist guerillas were initially more numerous than the partisans, they were not as well organized and faced a public relations problem due to perceptions of collaboration with the Germans.…”

“…Suffering catastrophic losses and large-scale defections to the Soviets, the OUN-B re-organized the UPA into small, mobile units suitable for guerilla warfare and began a campaign of terror and intimidation against suspected Soviet agents. Groups selected for insurgent punishment included “Komsomol members, Red Army officers, policemen, … those who evade service in UPA, along with their families”, “collectivization activists”, agricultural specialists dispatched from East Ukraine, peasants who conceded to Soviet grain requisitions or failed to deliver food supplies to the UPA, and civilians who paid government duties, voted in local elections or were even slightly suspected of treason (Statiev, 2010; 124; Dyukov et al, 2009: 16–17). While this violence was selective by intent, the overwhelming majority (74%) of the insurgent attacks in Figure 7 were directed at civilians.…”

“…If the OUN selected this approach on the expectation of civilian bandwagoning, this assumption at first proved justified. As one participant wrote, “there is no point in doing political work in areas … where [the OUN] perpetrates such violence” (Statiev, 2010: 129). The proportion of insurgents voluntarily surrendering to Soviet authorities (as opposed to those killed in action or captured) declined from 32% to 16% between 1945 and 1946.…”

Untitled

“…Local translation was a risky project, especially from 1944 to the early 1950s, which were marked with anti-Soviet resistance fights in Lithuania (see Statiev 2010) and, following the death of Stalin in 1953, political destabilisation. Soviet Lithuanian historians were understandably careful to avoid any ideological errors.…”