Organizing to rule: structure, agent, and explaining presidential management styles in Africa

Ishiyama, John; Breuning, Marijke; Widmeier, Michael

doi:10.1080/13510347.2017.1391793

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…More broadly, however, the findings above suggest that greater attention should be paid to the idiosyncratic characteristics of individual autocratic leaders in order to explain their behavior. This is consistent with a relatively new trend in international relations and comparative politics scholarship, which has begun to move away from a focus on structural explanations for leader behavior, to agent-based explanations (Horowitz et al, 2015;Ishiyama et al, 2018).…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 76%

Authoritarian survival strategies and elite churn: The case of North Korea

Ishiyama

Kim

2020

International Area Studies Review

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How do autocrats interact with authoritarian elites? This is a question that has gained increasing scholarly attention over the past decade. In this article, using the case of North Korea we develop a set of theoretical expectations for “elite churn” or changes in the composition of the elite (either in terms of promotions, demotions, or new entrants) resulting from moving around elites from office to office (or “elite shuffle”) and bringing in new elites. We test a number of theoretical expectations derived from the existing literature on elite management in autocracies and then examine these expectations using a panel data set of 351 members of the North Korean elite from 1948–2017. Taking into account leadership characteristics, threats to the regime (both internal and external), external opportunities, and structural factors, we find that the explanation for elite churn in North Korea is very leader specific, and is much more pronounced under Kim Jong Un than his predecessors. This suggests that Kim Jong Un’s position was much more tenuous than his father’s and grandfather’s and likely continues to be so.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 76%

Authoritarian survival strategies and elite churn: The case of North Korea

Ishiyama

Kim

2020

International Area Studies Review

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“…Prime ministers select the members of their cabinet in an effort to promote the survival and stability of the regime (Annesley et al, 2019;Arriola, 2009;Berlinski et al, 2010;Dowding and Dumont, 2009;Fischer et al, 2012;Ishiyama et al, 2018;Stepan and Skach, 1993). This objective is served, in part, by recruiting capable individuals, that is, ministers who have the requisite skills and experience to serve as head of their department and members of the cabinet.…”

Section: Domestic Constituencies and International Pressuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Changes in the cabinet can signal efforts to mediate political upheaval and signal a new direction (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008;Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). At the same time, new leaders are untested and their survival is not ensured; therefore, much depends on their ability to secure the cooperation of others (Arriola, 2009;Ishiyama et al, 2018;Svolik, 2012).…”

Section: Domestic Constituencies and International Pressuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ministerial and cabinet stability have been studied most often in the context of West European parliamentary systems. However, leaders in other political systems-such as one-party states with limited competition or other semi-authoritarian governments-also face periods of high uncertainty, especially at the start of their tenure when they have not yet consolidated their position vis-à-vis other members of the political elite (Ishiyama et al, 2018;Svolik, 2012).…”

Section: Domestic Constituencies and International Pressuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Especially in politically and ethnically divided societies (such as Ethiopia), it may be attractive for leaders to coopt political elites who represent these constituencies. This may be especially true when there are a larger number of political and ethnic competitors (Ishiyama et al, 2018). In such cases, the selection of cabinet members can help to build a coalition that balances competing political forces to secure their cooperation in governing the country (Stepan and Skach, 1993;Svolik, 2012).…”

Section: Domestic Constituencies and International Pressuresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Half of the Cabinet: Explaining Ethiopia’s Move to Gender Parity in the Government

Breuning¹,

Okundaye

2021

Journal of Asian and African Studies

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Half a year after rising to the position of prime minister in Ethiopia, Abiy Ahmed appointed a cabinet that included an unprecedented 50% women, including the first female minister of defense. This was noteworthy, because women had not been well-represented in Ethiopian political leadership. What motivated the appointment of so many women? We argue that the selection of ministers in aid-dependent global south countries responds to external cues—and that this leads to more women in the cabinet. Our findings regarding Ethiopia’s 50% female cabinet suggest that the role of external cues in cabinet selection deserves further investigation.

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The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies

Bokobza

Krishnarajan

Nyrup

et al. 2022

The Journal of Politics

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All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely cabinet ministers. Using a new global dataset, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets, and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in post. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.

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Organizing to rule: structure, agent, and explaining presidential management styles in Africa

Cited by 6 publications

References 41 publications

Authoritarian survival strategies and elite churn: The case of North Korea

Authoritarian survival strategies and elite churn: The case of North Korea

Half of the Cabinet: Explaining Ethiopia’s Move to Gender Parity in the Government

The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies

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