The Morning After: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies

Abstract

All autocrats rely on inner-circle elites to stay in power. It is commonly assumed that dictators will purge these elites if they unsuccessfully try to unseat the dictator in a coup. However, this assumption has never been tested in a global analysis. Furthermore, little is known about whom dictators target in such purges. This article focuses on the highest levels of the regime, namely cabinet ministers. Using a new global dataset, our analysis covers over 23,000 cabinet members in 115 autocracies from 1967 to 2016. We demonstrate that failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets, and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in post. The article presents the most detailed individual-level evidence to date on purges and offers key insights into power-sharing mechanisms in autocracies.

Do winners spread more words? Factional competition and local media reports on corruption investigation in China

“…The recent literature of elite purges in autocracies provides insights supporting this claim. Several studies investigate the targets of purges under dictatorship and find that competent and experienced elites are more likely to be purged by a dictator as they are perceived as greater threats (Wong and Chan, 2021;Goldring and Matthews, 2021;Bokobza et al, 2022).…”

The Comparative Politics of Cabinet Reshuffles

“…There is also important recent work on the more particular issue of how and when dictators purge their cabinets or individual members after failed coups. Using a new data set, which covers some 23,000 cabinet members from 115 autocracies in the period 1967-2016, Laure Bokobza, Suthan Krishnarajan, Jacob Nyrup, Casper Sakstrup and Lasse Aaskoven reveal that 'failed coups induce autocrats to increasingly purge their cabinets', 'and that they do so selectively by targeting higher-ranking cabinet members and those who hold strategic positions, while keeping more loyal and veteran ministers in posts' (Bokobza et al 2022(Bokobza et al : 1437.…”

To Purge or Not to Purge? An Individual-Level Quantitative Analysis of Elite Purges in Dictatorships

“…Secondly, the article suggests that dictators are careful and strategic with using violence against regime elites; just as many dictators surgically select victims for targeted repression (Xu 2021), they are also precise in using violence against their supporters to avoid negative repercussions (Sudduth 2017). Thirdly, the article joins a growing literature (Bokobza et al forthcoming; Nyrup and Bramwell 2020; Woldense 2018) that uses innovative data on autocratic elites to expose the secretive inner workings of dictatorships, showing how dictators manipulate the internal balance of power to survive in office (relatedly, see Pepinsky 2014; Svolik 2012).…”

“…Dictators possess various management tools to keep their ruling coalition in line, including the ability to appoint new officials (Shih, Adolph, and Liu 2012), rotate personnel (Woldense 2018) and purge elites (Sudduth 2017). Purges – when a dictator forcibly removes an individual from the regime's ruling coalition – are the subject of a nascent but growing body of research (Bokobza et al forthcoming; Boutton 2019; Bove and Rivera 2015; Easton and Siverson 2018a; Sudduth 2017; Sudduth 2021; van der Maat 2020; Wong and Chan 2021). However, we know comparatively little about why dictators target specific elites or why dictators purge them in certain ways.…”

“…Data identifying these elites and their demographic and professional characteristics come from thousands of primary and secondary sources; they provide a revealing window through which to examine the opacity of autocratic elite politics across the world. Scholars have recently introduced important datasets relating to autocratic elite purges of military officials across regimes (Sudduth 2021) and cabinet ministers within regimes (Bokobza et al forthcoming; Nyrup and Bramwell 2020). However, our dataset is the first to include a sample of the civilian and military elites within key ruling institutions across a range of dictatorships.…”