Organizational protection for whistleblowers: a cross-national study

The origins and effects of public servant confidence in whistleblowing protection regimes

“…While others have focused their investigations on the personal attributes of potential whistleblowers—for which there is an emerging consensus on critical factors—we are attentive to what shapes one's confidence in the regime. Chordiya et al () argue that positive perceptions of organizational protection for whistleblowers are a major factor influencing an individual's decision to blow the whistle, yet Thomas () has argued that in a comparative context around the world, whistleblowing regimes are generally ‘failing’, citing a low number of disclosures as evidence. The implication of these two claims is that there are not a lot of disclosures because public servants do not have confidence in their whistleblowing regimes to protect them from retaliation if they report alleged wrongdoing.…”

“…Why do we care about confidence in a whistleblowing regime? Chordiya et al (, p. 2) argue that positive perceptions of organizational protection for whistleblowers is a major factor influencing an individual's decision to blow the whistle, and from a managerial perspective it is also a ‘good measure to evaluate organizational success in creating favourable environments for internal whistleblowing’. The mere presence of statutory whistleblowing protections should not be assumed to be sufficient to enable and protect disclosures.…”

“…Chordiya et al () found in a comparative study of public servants in the US, China, Taiwan and Malaysia that awareness of whistleblowing laws and mandatory ethics training were among the most important factors contributing to greater confidence in their respective whistleblowing regime. Caillier () likewise found in a massive 2010 US survey of federal employees that education related to whistleblowing is positively associated with whistleblowing intentions, which is suggestive of the signal effects of organizations' values.…”

Research on Air Pollution Control in China: From the Perspective of Quadrilateral Evolutionary Games

“…Equation 28indicates the four-party pure strategy solutions, which mean that the probability of the strategy selection of quadrilateral game participants is a certain value of 0 or 1. According to Equation (28), it can be seen that the probability of the quadrilateral game participants is all 0 or 1, and there are 16 strategy sets.…”

“…From the perspective of public participation, on the one hand, air pollution should cause the public (the direct victims of pollution) to blow the whistle; on the other hand, the personal information leakage during whistleblowing and harassment and retaliation by polluters after whistleblowing would weaken the public's initiative to participate. Therefore, it might be the case that some victims of pollution did not blow the whistle [25][26][27][28].…”