Organization and Decision‐Making in Enforced Networks: The River Groups in Northern Sweden

Abstract

This paper examines the Swedish experience of network governance in managing flooding and high flows in Swedish rivers. The aim is to study the networks' organizations and approaches to decision making, and the focus of the paper is on the regional responsibility for coordinating risk awareness and risk analysis in terms of information, prevention and actions. We argue that the absence of central guidelines in the organization of the networks and the fact that the networks are enforced by the government rather than spontaneously formed by participants have resulted in different solutions in terms of focus, organization and decision making, with implications for the networks' effectiveness and the exchange of experience among the networks. These differences and their effects are analyzed in this paper. The study concludes that as a consequence of the vague instructions from the government, the River Groups differ in terms of both decision making and organization, which affect the internal work and organization of the groups. The conclusions reached here are based on interviews with the coordinators of the county administrative boards, complemented by a document study and a literature review.

Planning for resilience in the case of power shortage: The Swedish STYREL policy

“…Even the evaluations that have been carried out after the pilot study in 2007 and the first round of Styrel planning in 2011 show that only limited contact has occurred between the CABs and private actors. Olausson & Nyhlén (2017) show that vague instructions in the implementation of a policy can imply a range of different interpretations of the policy and thereby also different ways of implementing the policy at stake. During Styrel, some form of collaboration has occurred but the implementation of this collaboration differ between the municipalities and between the counties.…”

“…which was formed at the beginning of the 1990s on the initiative of the actors involved, all of whom saw the need for collaboration. When the river groups were subsequently formed as a result of the River Safety Investigation 1997, these networks operated for a lengthy period of time parallel to the Coordination Group (see Olausson & Nyhlén, 2017;Petridou & Olausson, 2017). A study of the river groups in northern Sweden shows that the vague instructions, which preceded the formation of the river groups.…”

“…Combined with differing understandings of the need of the network, this effected the implementation of the policy. Consequently, the different river groups work differently in terms of which actors are involved, the point of focus regarding the collaboration, and which activities and operations that each group encompasses (see Olausson & Nyhlén, 2017).…”

“…The aim of the river groups is to exchange information through collaboration in networks in the event of floods and high river levels. The vague instructions from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (a former government agency which merged into the newly formed MSB on 1 January 2009) has, however, implied that the various river groups work in different ways, have different points of focus for their collaboration, and include different actors (Olausson & Nyhlén, 2017).…”

Implementation through collaborative crisis management and contingency planning: the case of dam failure in Sweden

“…In 1997, following recommendations of the national River Safety Investigation (SOU 1995:40), the Swedish government called for the formation of river groups, although no guidelines were provided (Olausson and Nyhl en 2017). Today, around 30 river groups have been established in Sweden, with the mission to assess risk and water status, engage in coordination of information and suggest measures to reduce flood losses before and during high water flows (SvK 2016).…”