Optimality Reasoning in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology

Henry, Devin; Lennox, Jim; Leunissen, Mariska; Karbowski, Joe; Stoyles, Byron J.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199679430.003.0007

Cited by 10 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…It presents Aristotle as arguing fallaciously, it misconstrues the progression of the text, which leads to and not from the notion of a best good (NE I 1, 1094a18-22), and it does not easily take account of the neuter plural panta (NE I 1, 1094a3), which suggests a claim beyond the practical domain. 6 The views of Judson (2005), Gotthelf (2012), andHenry (2013) suggest such an interpretation. 7 The relevance of this passage was drawn to my attention by Barney (2007, 310).…”

Section: Absolute Goodness and Goodness In A Kindmentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Baker

2016

Philos Stud

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Kraut (2011) and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics [NE], I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin (in Section 2) by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind (in Section 3) and good for something (in Section 4) can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good "in itself." I argue (in Section 5) contra Gotthelf (2012) that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value-e.g. "Man is the best of all animals"-Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus (in Section 6) on one passage, Aristotle's division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture.

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Section: Absolute Goodness and Goodness In A Kindmentioning

confidence: 99%

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Baker

2016

Philos Stud

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“…I think the teleology which Aristotle wants to defend is different from the Platonic version. For recent discussion of Aristotle's teleology, see for example Johnson (2005); Leunissen (2010); Gotthelf (2012); Henry (2013). Gotthelf (2012) 71-74 provides a good overview of the scholarship on this subject.…”

Section: Teleology Value and Pleasurementioning

confidence: 99%

Speusippus, teleology and the metaphysics of value: Theophrastus’ Metaphysics 11a18–26

Cheng

2020

J. Hell. Stud.

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Abstract:This paper re-examines Theophrastus’ Metaphysics 11a18–26, an obscure testimony about Speusippus, the second head of the Platonic Academy. As opposed to the traditional interpretation, which takes this passage as Theophrastus’ polemic against Speusippus’ doctrine of value, I argue that he here makes dialectical use of, rather than launching an attack on, the Platonist. Based on this new reading, I further propose a revision and a reassessment of the ‘gloomy metaphysics’ of Speusippus which will shed new light on his ethics.

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“…Los estudios de optimalidad tienen una larga tradición en la historia de la biología. Por ejemplo, tanto en la biología aristotélica como en la teología natural se explicaba la presencia de un rasgo apelando al hecho de que estaba óptimamente diseñado para satisfacer su telos o su función (Blanco 2008, Henry 2013. Sin embargo, es en los años 60' y 70' del siglo XX en los que el enfoque contemporáneo de este tipo de estudios se desarrolla, vía los llamados "modelos de optimalidad".…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Dos usos de los modelos de optimalidad en las explicaciones por selección natural

Ginnobili

Roffé

2017

Metatheo

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El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar las relaciones entre los modelos de optimalidad y la selección natural. Defenderemos que esas relaciones pueden dividirse en dos tipos, en tanto hay dos tipos de explicaciones seleccionistas, que llamaremos “históricas” y “ahistóricas”. Las explicaciones históricas revelan como una población dada adquiere un rasgo que es adaptativo en ese ambiente e involucran muchas generaciones, variación, etc. Las explicaciones ahistóricas, explican por qué, en determinado momento, ciertos tipos de organismos tienen un mayor éxito reproductivo que otros. Mostraremos que los modelos de optimalidad pueden jugar un rol en la determinación del explanandum de las explicaciones histórica seleccionistas, esto es, que ayudan a reconocer qué rasgos son adaptativos. Por otra parte, mostramos que los modelos de optimalidad nos permiten determinar a veces la parte del explanans de las explicaciones ahistóricas (particularmente, el concepto de fitness).

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Optimality Reasoning in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology

Cited by 10 publications

References 8 publications

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

The metaphysics of goodness in the ethics of Aristotle

Speusippus, teleology and the metaphysics of value: Theophrastus’ Metaphysics 11a18–26

Dos usos de los modelos de optimalidad en las explicaciones por selección natural

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