Optimal soft-order revisions under demand and supply uncertainty and upstream information

Baruah, Pundarikaksha; Chinnam, Ratna Babu; Korostelev, A. P.; Dalkiran, Evrim

doi:10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.08.009

Cited by 15 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Most theoretical studies propose contracts and sharing formats to induce truthful demand forecast sharing (Amornpetchkul et al 2015, Cachon and Lariviere 2001, Chen et al 2016, Jiang et al 2016, Mishra et al 2009, € Ozer and Wei 2006, Shamir and Shin 2016, Taylor and Xiao 2010. For truthful order forecast sharing, Durango- Yano (2006, 2011) propose forecast-commitment contracts, which require commitments by both the buyer and supplier to purchase/deliver a certain fraction of the submitted forecasts, while Baruah et al (2016) propose a soft order revision mechanism for the buyer, where she needs to pay an upfront deposit for the soft order, with or without access to the supplier's inventory position information.…”

Section: Forecast Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For truthful order forecast sharing, Durango‐Cohen and Yano (2006, 2011) propose forecast–commitment contracts, which require commitments by both the buyer and supplier to purchase/deliver a certain fraction of the submitted forecasts, while Baruah et al. (2016) propose a soft order revision mechanism for the buyer, where she needs to pay an upfront deposit for the soft order, with or without access to the supplier's inventory position information.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Does Forecast‐Accuracy‐Based Allocation Induce Customers to Share Truthful Order Forecasts?

Pekgün

Park

Keskinocak

et al. 2019

Production and Operations Management

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Through a behavioral study, we investigate buyers’ strategic order forecasting behavior in a multi‐period setting under a forecast accuracy‐based allocation policy, where the supplier allocates (proportionally) more inventory to the buyer with the better order forecast accuracy in case of scarce supply. We developed an interactive game that simulates a supply chain in which one supplier sells a key component to two buyers, who in turn sell to consumers. In each period, buyers share forecasts of future orders with their supplier. The participants in the game play the role of a buyer, while the supplier is automated. Our experimental findings suggest that rewarding forecast accuracy in allocating inventory can significantly improve the order forecast accuracy of the buyers and reduce their forecast inflation behavior. Interestingly, even without communication of the policy, buyers learn over time that more accurate forecasts lead to better service from their supplier and improve their order forecast accuracy.

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Section: Forecast Sharingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Review and Hypothesis Developmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Forecast‐Accuracy‐Based Allocation Induce Customers to Share Truthful Order Forecasts?

Pekgün

Park

Keskinocak

et al. 2019

Production and Operations Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…For the profit allocation problem under the traditional classic mode, the additional profit generated by the collaboration is usually taken as a part of the coordination cost of the collaboration organizer. This part of the profit is characterized by the coordination coefficient  (Baruah et al, 2016). However, the organizer of a collaborative alliance in emergencies is usually a functional department, such as the government or a public welfare organization.…”

Section: Profit Allocation and Strictly Monotonous Path (Smp)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Emergency logistics network design based on space–time resource configuration

Wang

Peng

2021

Knowledge-Based Systems

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“…Information will be exchanged and shared in the supply chain when some firms have private information (see [3,6,36]). Information sharing is an effective method to mitigate the bullwhip effect and improve efficiency of the supply chain (see [1,27,37,39]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

2021

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We consider ex post demand information sharing and leakage in a two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers competing in quantities. The incumbent retailer has an advantage to acquire information about the market at a cost. If he invests in information acquisition, he privately acquires a signal about the market demand. We examine the incumbent’s incentive of information acquisition and sharing, and the upstream supplier’s information leakage strategy. We confirm that the incumbent’s information acquisition and sharing decisions depend on whether the information acquisition is observable. When it is observable, the incumbent fully shares his private signals even though the shared high signal may hurt him. However, when it is unobservable, the incumbent can share the favorable signal (low signal) and withhold the unfavorable signal (high signal). Moreover, we also find that the supplier will always leak the signal to the entrant no matter what signal she acquires. In addition, we demonstrate under the information sharing and leakage strategy, it may benefit the whole supply chain when the retail competition intensity is not very large.

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Optimal soft-order revisions under demand and supply uncertainty and upstream information

Cited by 15 publications

References 44 publications

Does Forecast‐Accuracy‐Based Allocation Induce Customers to Share Truthful Order Forecasts?

Does Forecast‐Accuracy‐Based Allocation Induce Customers to Share Truthful Order Forecasts?

Emergency logistics network design based on space–time resource configuration

Information sharing and leakage in the two-echelon supply chain

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