Optimal incentives for income-generation in universities: the rule of thumb for the Compton tax

The governance of formal university–industry interactions: understanding the rationales for alternative models

“…However, studies that explicitly consider formal academic consulting activity as a distinct knowledge transfer channel highlight its importance (see e.g. Rebne, 1989;Cohen et al, 2002;Beath et al, 2003;Perkmann and Walsh, 2008;Jensen et al, 2010) and suggest that consulting includes a wide range of activities linked to the exploitation of existing knowledge, the commercialization of research results and the performance of original research (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008;Dechenaux et al, 2007).…”

Interactive vs. non-interactive knowledge production by faculty members

“…This approach draws from previous models by Beath et al (2003) and Jensen and Thursby (2004). A difference with our model is that we do not introduce faculty members' time devoted to research in the utility function but faculty members' research output.…”

University-Industry Knowledge Interaction in Switzerland: What University Scientists Think About Co-Operation With Private Enterprises

“…Beath et al (2003) and Jensen and Thursby (2004) study faculty research incentives in the framework of a principal agent model where the university is the principal and the faculty member the agent. The analysis in Beath (2003) is static and investigates the potential for the university to ease its budget constraints by allowing academic scientists to conduct applied research on a consulting basis.…”

“…Beath et al (2003) and Jensen and Thursby (2004) study faculty research incentives in the framework of a principal agent model where the university is the principal and the faculty member the agent. The analysis in Beath (2003) is static and investigates the potential for the university to ease its budget constraints by allowing academic scientists to conduct applied research on a consulting basis. They argue that by allowing academics to supplement their income, universities may be able to hold down academic salaries: Furthermore, universities can effectively "tax" the income that academics raise through applied research or consultancy, for example through the imposition of "overhead charges".…”