Operational Convergence or Divergence? Exploring the Influence of Islamic State on Militant Groups in Pakistan

Jadoon, Amira

doi:10.1080/1057610x.2022.2058374

Cited by 2 publications

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“…At different points in its lifespan, ISK comprised of discontiguous subgroups in provinces and districts throughout Afghanistan (Jadoon and Mines 2020). These sub-groups were usually led by local leaders with prior militant group affiliations, and pre-existing operational networks and resource channels (Giustozzi 2018;Jadoon and Mines 2020;Osman 2020). While collectively, they all form constituent parts of ISK as an organization, there is little evidence in open-source reporting, captured internal documents, government reporting, or scholarly works that is indicative of strong operational connections between these discontiguous groups.…”

Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it is possible that we might observe some spillover effects in areas where ISK happened to maintain operational networks in adjacent districts, e.g. in Achin and Deh Bala districts in southern Nangarhar province during the group's zenith in 2015-2016 (Giustozzi 2018;Jadoon and Mines 2020). Future work employing spatial analysis could be used to explore these geographical linkages, and assess how spillover effects are conditioned by groups' structures, but this line of inquiry requires a differently structured dataset using spatial analytical tools, which while important to investigate is beyond the scope of this study.…”

Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5. The original dataset was first introduced in a Combating Terrorism Center report (see Jadoon and Mines, 2020) by the authors without a release of the data. The dataset has since been amended and expanded.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To explore these effects, we employ a new dataset of fine-grained and geo-located weekly violence incidents perpetrated by ISK between 2015 and 2019 at the district-level, as well as ISK's leadership losses across four tiers (i.e. levels) during the same time period (Jadoon and Mines 2020). Overall, our sample is restricted to districts where ISK militants perpetrated an attack, and/or experienced leadership losses.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Targeting Quality or Quantity? The Divergent Effects of Targeting Upper Verses Lower-Tier Leaders of Militant Organizations

Jadoon

Mines

Milton

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Research on the efficacy of leadership decapitation has focused primarily on targeting the topmost leaders of groups. Yet, most organizations rely on multiple leaders with specific functional or geographical responsibilities, rather than a single symbolic leader. In this context, we pose the following question: how are the effects of leadership decapitation on a group’s short-term operational capacity conditioned by the type or rank of targeted leaders? We argue that due to the risks faced by militant organizations, upper-tier leaders will delegate operational duties to lower-tier leadership for security purposes. Because of the shift of the principal-agent dynamic to lower-tier leaders, targeting of lower ranked leaders versus topmost leaders is more likely to result in a loss of control over foot soldiers, and trigger negative effects such as a rise in indiscriminate violence. We conduct our study using the case of Islamic State Khorasan in Afghanistan, with weekly data on the group’s attacks, and multi-tier leadership losses between 2015–2019 across 72 districts. 1

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Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Analysis and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Targeting Quality or Quantity? The Divergent Effects of Targeting Upper Verses Lower-Tier Leaders of Militant Organizations

Jadoon

Mines

Milton

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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The Strategic Logic of Large Militant Alliance Networks

Blair

Potter

2022

Journal of Global Security Studies

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Ideological and operational credibility are essential to the success of transnational terrorist organizations. We demonstrate that militant groups can leverage large alliance networks to bolster their ideological and operational reputations. Organizations can draw on operational capabilities and successes to build international networks that bolster their ideological credibility. Conversely, organizations with reputations for ideological authority can lend it to affiliates, who offer reach into active conflicts, bolstering claims to operational capacity. This logic of comparative advantage suggests that militant alliances can be a strategic response to underlying material or ideological deficits. We illustrate these dynamics through data-driven case studies of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State's cooperative networks.

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Operational Convergence or Divergence? Exploring the Influence of Islamic State on Militant Groups in Pakistan

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Targeting Quality or Quantity? The Divergent Effects of Targeting Upper Verses Lower-Tier Leaders of Militant Organizations

Targeting Quality or Quantity? The Divergent Effects of Targeting Upper Verses Lower-Tier Leaders of Militant Organizations

The Strategic Logic of Large Militant Alliance Networks

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