Open Regionalism and the Pacific Alliance: The Case of the sura Group as a Private Sector Actor

Since its creation a decade ago, the Pacific Alliance has established itself as one of the most important regional blocs in Latin America. Its free-market orientation, clearly neoliberal, and its pragmatic decision-making strategy have been highlighted as its main strengths. This article will demonstrate that, despite the ideological changes that have taken place in its members, the Alliance will continue to be an important tool in these members' respective foreign policies. Precisely because of its pragmatism, the coming to power in Peru and Chile of governments critical of neoliberalism did not affect the development of the Pacific Alliance. Likewise, the political changes that have occurred more recently in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru do not seem to imply a weakening of the of it. By contrast, following its pragmatic profile, the new ideological framework prevailing in the Alliance could serve to face the difficult situation and advance in bloc's process of deep integration.

Section: The Pacific Alliance and Its Neoliberal Orientationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideological changes and pragmatism in the Pacific Alliance

Arévalo

Quichua

2023

“…These types of agreements aim to substitute imports from countries outside the area, and there is an increase in industrialization, protectionism, and tariff and nontariff barriers to third parties to protect and promote the intra‐zonal industry. By contrast, if the projection is abroad, there is open regionalism , 7 whose aims is to promote the establishment of open trade agreements subject to international competition and immersed in the multilateral trading system (Pereyra, 2007; p. 13; Vargas‐Alzate, et al, 2022).…”

Section: The Objectivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional pragmatism of the Pacific Alliance: Does it favor a deep integration?

Álvarez

2023

This article aims to establish whether the Pacific Alliance truly configures a pragmatic regionalization scheme in Latin America. It approaches the study of its Constitutive Treaty to interpret its provisions-in light of the economic and legal theories of integration-and addresses its developments, so we can consider if the member countries intend willfully to achieve a deep integration or if these plans are merely baseless statements. We analyze the ostentatious challenges imposed by the preamble and its attractive-or perhaps wishful-objectives. Then, we verify or question the institutional framework to determine if it is strong enough. Finally, we consider if the Alliance has legal personality as an international organization. The inevitable conclusion is that, despite the noble and lofty objectives laid out in the Constitutive Treaty of the Pacific Alliance, its member countries have made little to no effort to materialize them with each other or in their relationships with third-party countries-observer countries and those located in the Asia-Pacific region.

“…In Latin America, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) sponsored open regionalism to overcome the economic crisis of the 1980s, by promoting economic cooperation and integration agreements, making regional integration compatible with multilateral openness (ECLAC, 1994). Scholars have also advanced in the study of how open regionalism developed in Latin American regional integration blocs throughout the 1990s (Vargas‐Alzate & Amaya Alviar, 2021).…”

Section: An Assessment Of 10 Years Of the Pacific Alliance And Its Re...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alongside this summit, a “business summit” was held, where it was established that any country could only join the Pacific Alliance if it had signed at least one free trade agreement with each member of the bloc (Oyarzún & Rojas, 2013). Later that year, the Pacific Alliance Business Council (CEAP) was established to engage the private sector in the integration process (Alianza del Pacífico, 2012b) and since then, the CEAP has been an institutional space in which the private actors from each country can present their demands and formulate policies in accordance with the strategy of trade openness, a central element of open regionalism (Vargas‐Alzate & Amaya Alviar, 2021).…”

Section: An Assessment Of 10 Years Of the Pacific Alliance And Its Re...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Chile has incorporated open regionalism into its international insertion since the 1990s, as a tool to enhance its trade policies and regional preferences (Oyarzún Serrano, 2018). In the same way, the Colombian private sector benefits from and espouses open regionalism in the Pacific Alliance (Vargas-Alzate & Amaya Alviar, 2021). For Peru, the experience of signing Free Trade Agreements formed an "openness coalition" with governments that supported the deepening of the economic model, which also served as a guideline to its foreign policy (Ramírez, 2018).…”

Section: The Pacific Alliance and Its Influence | 153mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Pacific Alliance and its influence on South American regionalism

Gonçalves

2023

When the Pacific Alliance was created in 2011, its proposal to reestablish open regionalism led to a debate on the fragmentation of regional integration and the Atlantic-Pacific divide. A decade later, Latin American regionalism is under stress, but the Pacific Alliance is not. Moreover, regionalism in South America displays features that are observed in the Pacific Alliance. From a constructivist framework, this article analyzes how the ideas from the Pacific Alliance shaped the early development of Prosur, highlighting the role of Chile, Colombia, and Peru in influencing South American regionalism. This article aims to contribute to debates on the future of Latin American regionalism by stressing how the Pacific Alliance influences regionalism, dispelling the idea that it is a mere trade bloc, and showing how it consolidates the Bogotá-Lima-Santiago axis in South American regionalism. It sheds light on the relevance of this regional bloc in political terms and on the agency capacity (achievements and limits) of Colombia, Peru, and Chile in setting a regional agenda.