Open-minded imitation can achieve near-optimal vaccination coverage

Xin, Ying; Gerberry, David; Just, Winfried

doi:10.1007/s00285-019-01401-z

Cited by 9 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 48 publications

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“…Information-driven vaccination behavior significantly reduces the social cost of infection and facilitates the process of disease eradication [18] but ignores individual considerations of vaccine costs and vaccine spillover effects. The reason is that unvaccinated, self-interested individuals are dedicated to obtaining protection from other vaccinated individuals [19,20]. For instance, [21] combined classical game theory with an epidemic model, revealing the "free-rider" behavior of self-interested individuals.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vaccination strategies in the disease–behavior evolution model

Zhou,

Dai,

et al. 2024

Front. Phys.

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Previous studies on the co-evolving between vaccination strategies and epidemics mainly assumed that the vaccination strategies were made in the period between two spreading seasons. However, individual cognition during the spreading seasons might also alter the vaccination strategy and inversely influence the epidemic spreading. We propose a coupled disease–behavior model to describe the dynamic evolution of vaccination behavior during the spread of infectious diseases. The model integrates a susceptible–infected–vaccinated (SIV) model with the diffusion of vaccination behavior. We focus on the trade-off between perceptions of infection risk and the vaccination behaviors of neighbors, characterizing individual vaccination opinions. We introduce an opinion-critical value to map vaccination opinions into vaccination behavior. The vaccination coverage of the disease–behavior model is studied in network models and real-world networks. In addition, when societal costs are measured based on the degree of initial vaccinees, the cost of randomly selecting initial vaccinees is lower than selecting individuals with high or low degrees as vaccinees. Evaluating an individual’s ability to transmit vaccination behavior based on the neighbor’s number is inappropriate. We find that the impact of effective spreading rates on group vaccination is not one-sided and that reducing fear and highlighting the dangers of infectious diseases are crucial to increasing vaccination coverage.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vaccination strategies in the disease–behavior evolution model

Zhou,

Dai,

et al. 2024

Front. Phys.

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Open-minded imitation can achieve near-optimal vaccination coverage

2019

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Studies of voluntary vaccination decisions by rational individuals predict that the population will reach a Nash equilibrium with vaccination coverage below the societal optimum. Human decision-making involves mechanisms in addition to rational calculations of self-interest, such as imitation of successful others. Previous research had shown that imitation alone cannot achieve better results. Under realistic choices of the parameters it may lead to equilibrium vaccination coverage even below the Nash equilibrium. However, these findings rely on the widely accepted use of Fermi functions for modeling the probabilities of switching to another strategy. We consider here a more general functional form of the switching probabilities. It is consistent with functions that give best fits for empirical data in a widely cited psychological experiment and involves one additional parameter α. This parameter can be loosely interpreted as a degree of open-mindedness. We found both by means of simulations and analytically that sufficiently high values of α will drive the equilibrium vaccination coverage arbitrarily close to the societal optimum.

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A game-theoretic model of rabies in domestic dogs with multiple voluntary preventive measures

et al. 2022

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Game theory is now routinely applied to quantitatively model the decision making of individuals presented with various voluntary actions that can prevent a given disease. Most models consider only a single preventive strategy and the case where multiple preventative actions are available is severely understudied. In our paper, we consider a very simple SI compartmental model of rabies in the domestic dog population. We study two choices of the dog owners: to vaccinate their dogs or to restrict the movements of unvaccinated dogs. We analyze the relatively rich patterns of Nash equilibria (NE). We show that there is always at least one NE at which the owners utilize only one form of prevention. However, there can be up to three different NEs at the same time: two NEs at which the owners use exclusively only the vaccination or movement restriction, and the third NE when the owners use both forms of prevention simultaneously. However, we also show that, unlike the first two types of NEs, the third kind of NE is not convergent stable.

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Open-minded imitation can achieve near-optimal vaccination coverage

Cited by 9 publications

References 48 publications

Vaccination strategies in the disease–behavior evolution model

Vaccination strategies in the disease–behavior evolution model

Open-minded imitation can achieve near-optimal vaccination coverage

A game-theoretic model of rabies in domestic dogs with multiple voluntary preventive measures

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