2007
DOI: 10.1163/090273507x249192
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On the Security Council as a Legislator: A Blessing or a Curse for the International Community?

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Cited by 9 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The Council then used its Chapter VII authority to adopt a binding resolution to impose the norms of the Convention on all member states regardless of their position (Bantekas 2003, 326). Several international lawyers concluded that despite the broad scope of discretion accorded to the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, it had acted ultra vires and ‘usurped’ political authority (Fremuth and Griebel 2007; Arato 2012; Cohen 2012). On the other hand, the permanent Council members always maintained that the measures were covered by the powers conferred to it in the Charter and thus impeccable from a legal perspective.…”
Section: Illustrating Io Exceptionalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Council then used its Chapter VII authority to adopt a binding resolution to impose the norms of the Convention on all member states regardless of their position (Bantekas 2003, 326). Several international lawyers concluded that despite the broad scope of discretion accorded to the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, it had acted ultra vires and ‘usurped’ political authority (Fremuth and Griebel 2007; Arato 2012; Cohen 2012). On the other hand, the permanent Council members always maintained that the measures were covered by the powers conferred to it in the Charter and thus impeccable from a legal perspective.…”
Section: Illustrating Io Exceptionalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The UNSC thus bypassed regular international law-making procedures based on state consent and assumed law-making competencies. Given its discretionary powers, this may or may not be seen as an act ultra vires in purely legal terms, but, in fact, the UNSC “usurped” legislative powers beyond its executive function and thus abrogated the authority structure as provided in the Charter (Elberling, 2005; Fremuth and Griebel, 2007; Rosand, 2004: 567): “The constituted power transforms itself … into the constituent power, to the total subversion of constitutionalism” (Arato, 2012: 654; see also Cohen, 2012: 279–280).…”
Section: Post-westphalian Orders Between Constitutionalism and Authoritarianismmentioning
confidence: 99%