International authority and the emergency problematique: IO empowerment through crises

Abstract

This paper applies the concept of emergency powers to the crisis politics of international organizations (IOs). In the recent past, IOs like the UN Security Council, the WHO, and the EU have reacted to large-scale crises by resorting to assertive governance modes bending the limits of their competence and infringing on the rights of the rule-addressees. In contrast to rational and sociological institutionalist notions of mission creep, this paper submits that this practice constitutes ‘authority leaps’ which follow a distinct logic of exceptionalism: the expansion of executive discretion in both the horizontal (lowering of checks and balances) and the vertical (reduction of legal protection of subjects) dimension, justified by reference to political necessity. This ‘IO exceptionalism’, as argued here, represents a class of events which is observable across fundamentally different international institutions and issue areas. It is important not least because emergency politics tend to leave longer-term imprints on a polity’s authority structures. This article shows that the emergency powers of IOs have a tendency to normalize and become permanent features of the institution. Thus IO exceptionalism and its ratcheting up represent a mechanism of abrupt but sustainable authority expansion at the level of IOs.

Institutional design for a post-liberal order: why some international organizations live longer than others

“…Similarly, global health governance has been marred by increased fragmentation between multiple actors (Brown and Held, 2017), which has often hampered an effective response by the WHO. However, the WHO secretariat emerged as the key player during the 2002 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) crisis and has since formally institutionalized its emergency powers (Kreuder-Sonnen, 2019: 197).…”

Beyond the emergency problematique: how do security IOs respond to crises—a case study of NATO response to COVID-19

“…70 Applying the "IO exceptionalism" argument in the global governance literature, NATO practice during the pandemic would be seen as a source of "authority leap". 71 However, the logic of exceptionalism could not be confirmed based on the data employed in this article: the examined IO has neither sought to lower checks and balances (horizontal dimension) nor to reduce the legal protection of the subjects (vertical dimension). To expedite delivery of medical equipment, a NATO call sign was used to simplify the standard procedure for military relief and speed up the Air Traffic Control clearances 72 in conjunction with the Eurocontrol.…”

“…This appears a refutation of the "normalisation" thesis 73 when applied to security IOs in times of pandemics. It might seem counter intuitive, especially in light of the growing securitisation literature 74 and notwithstanding that crisis management is part of the core mandate of NATO.…”

The Significance of Foreign Military Bases as Instruments of Spheres of Influence

“…The general mechanism of authority on the international arena basically does not differ from intrastate authority. Scholars' growing attention to the issue of international authority resulted in fruitful intellectual contribution (Cooley 2005;Fearon and Laitin 2004;Hurd 1999;Kreuder-Sonnen 2019;Lake 2007Lake , 2017; Voelsen and Schettler 2019; Zürn, Binder and Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012); nevertheless, it is still contested and replaced by a less controversial category of hegemony. A hegemon not only coerces subordinates but alters their agenda of policy options by his/her own presence and size (Destradi 2010;Ikenberry and Nexon 2019;Lanoszka 2013;Nexon and Neumann 2018;Prys 2010;Saull 2012).…”