On the Psychology of the Recognition Heuristic: Retrieval Primacy as a Key Determinant of Its Use

Abstract

The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension.

Reconsidering “evidence” for fast-and-frugal heuristics

“…Again, this result holds when criterion knowledge is controlled for ). In fact, proponents of fast-and-frugal heuristics have reported similar findings (see the Appendix in Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). Clearly, the recognition heuristic fails to explain how decision makers can discriminate between cases in which the recognition cue implies a correct decision and those cases in which it does notgiven that the recognition cue is supposed to be relied on in isolation.…”

“…Although the DI also has several limitations (Hilbig, 2010), it is the simplest proxy available so far that can be applied to any heuristic so long as inferences can be classified as correct versus false. For a similar approach, see the d′ measure proposed by Pachur and Hertwig (2006). The DI is defined as the difference in adherence rates between cases in which a heuristic implies a correct versus a false inference.…”

“…In this set, the AH actually had a validity of .68, which is relatively large, although once more below the mean recognition validity (.78). To assess the heuristic's use, the proportion of choices in line with its predictions was computed-that is, the adherence or accordance rate (e.g., Hertwig et al, 2008;Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). Across participants, the AH explained M 5 60% (SE 5 1%) of choices.…”

“…According to the search rule of the AH, one would initially compare the first letters in each of the city names-that is, D and S. Since they have different positions in the alphabet, the stopping rule applies, and the decision rule implies the choice of Seoul, because S appears later in the alphabet than D. As this also reveals, the AH is a single-cue noncompensatory rule like many other fast-and-frugal heuristics, thus yielding comparable simplicity. Indeed, the AH uses a cue that is even earlier "on the mental stage" (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006) and, thus, even more easily applicable than recognition.…”

GAME OVER: Empirical support for soccer bets regulation.

“…Participants could go back and forth in the online questionnaire until they finalized it. As previous studies found no effects of task order (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006), and to avoid further complexity, we used the same order of questions for all participants (cf. Pachur & Biele, 2007).…”