On the persistence of strategic sophistication

Georganas, Sotiris; Healy, Paul J.; Weber, Roberto A.

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.012

Cited by 119 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…However, if it is included, it becomes modal in CVT and second-most prevalent after the fully-cursed strategy in AT, and the prevalence of BNE falls substantially. 19 This finding is similar to Georganas et al (2013), who found very little correlation between measures of cognitive ability and playing more sophisticated strategies in undercutting and guessing games.…”

Section: Individual Heterogeneitysupporting

confidence: 57%

Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cox

2015

Journal of Public Economics

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The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. AbstractI show how improper conditioning of beliefs can reduce contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary, excludable public good. In equilibrium, provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naïve players who condition expectations only on their private information contribute too little, despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experiment, contributions indeed fall short of the equilibrium prediction. Using modified games with different belief-conditioning effects, I verify that subjects fail to condition beliefs properly. However, improper belief conditioning cannot fully explain the results.

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Section: Individual Heterogeneitysupporting

confidence: 57%

Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cox

2015

Journal of Public Economics

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“…2 See Bayer and Renou (2012), Burnham et al (2009), Brañas-Garza, Paz Espinosa, and Rey-Biel (2011), Carpenter, Graham, and Wolf (2013, Devetag and Warglien (2003), Georganas, Healy, and Weber (2010), and Gill and Prowse (2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive load and strategic sophistication

Allred

Duffy

Smith

2016

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We study the relationship between the cognitive load manipulation and strategic sophistication. The cognitive load manipulation is designed to reduce the subject's cognitive resources which are available for deliberation on a choice. In our experiment, subjects are placed under a large cognitive load (given a di¢ cult number to remember) or a low cognitive load (given a number which is not di¢ cult to remember). Subsequently, the subjects play a one-shot game then they are asked to recall the number. This procedure is repeated for various games, where a new number is given for each game. We …nd a nuanced and nonmonotonic relationship between cognitive load and strategic sophistication. This relationship is consistent with two e¤ects. First, subjects under a high cognitive load tend to exhibit behavior consistent with the reduced ability to compute the optimal decision. Second, the cognitive load tends to a¤ect the subject's perception of their relative standing in the distribution of cognitive ability. The net result of these two e¤ects depends on the strategic setting. Our experiment provides indirect evidence on the literature which examines the relationship between measures of cognitive ability and strategic sophistication.

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“…7 Agranov et al (2012) …nd that undergraduate students display higher strategic sophistication when playing the guessing game against graduate students than against computers. Georganas et al (2015) …nd a similar result in the undercutting game.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 62%

“…These results con…rm previous …ndings in the experimental literature highlighting the role of beliefs about the strategic sophistication of other players (Agranov et al, 2 1 We thank Colin Camerer for pointing this out. 31 2012; Georganas et al, 2015) and incentives (Alaoui and Penta, 2015) on depth of strategic reasoning. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2016) …nd that just mentioning gender is enough to reduce women's performance in real-e¤ort tasks perceived as male-biased.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, to investigate whether priming was e¤ec-tive in activating gender stereotypes. Second, given that depth of strategic reasoning depends on the perceived sophistication of others (Georganas et al, 2015;Agranov et al, 2012), to explore whether beliefs about the relative strategic sophistication of men and women in ‡uence behavior.…”

Section: Beliefs and Stereotypesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Gender Differences and Stereotypes in Strategic Thinking

Cubel

Sánchez‐Pagés

2016

SSRN Journal

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Recent literature has emphasized that individuals display varying levels of strategic reasoning. This paper presents ten years worth of experimental data from two countries exploring the existence and endogeneity of gender differences in strategic sophistication. We report results from two experimental studies employing the beauty contest game, one from the classroom and one from the laboratory. We observe robust and signi…cant gender differences in strategic sophistication in favour of men in zerostake situations. These differences disappear when a monetary prize is awarded. We also …find that depth of strategic reasoning varies with gender priming. Females display signi…cantly higher levels of strategic sophistication than males when gender is made salient. This effect of gender priming is driven by females who believe women are superior in the game.JEL Codes: C72, C91, D81, J16.

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On the persistence of strategic sophistication

Cited by 119 publications

References 56 publications

Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

Cognitive load and strategic sophistication

Gender Differences and Stereotypes in Strategic Thinking

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