Categorization with basic color terms is an intuitive and universal aspect of color perception. Yet research on visual working memory capacity has largely assumed that only continuous estimates within color space are relevant to memory. As a result, the influence of color categories on working memory remains unknown. We propose a dual content model of color representation in which color matches to objects that are either present (perception) or absent (memory) integrate category representations along with estimates of specific values on a continuous scale ("particulars"). We develop and test the model through 4 experiments. In a first experiment pair, participants reproduce a color target, both with and without a delay, using a recently influential estimation paradigm. In a second experiment pair, we use standard methods in color perception to identify boundary and focal colors in the stimulus set. The main results are that responses drawn from working memory are significantly biased away from category boundaries and toward category centers. Importantly, the same pattern of results is present without a memory delay. The proposed dual content model parsimoniously explains these results, and it should replace prevailing single content models in studies of visual working memory. More broadly, the model and the results demonstrate how the main consequence of visual working memory maintenance is the amplification of category related biases and stimulus-specific variability that originate in perception.

Working memory for color has been the central focus in an ongoing debate concerning the structure and limits of visual working memory. Within this area, the delayed estimation task has played a key role. An implicit assumption in color working memory research generally, and delayed estimation in particular, is that the fidelity of memory does not depend on color value (and, relatedly, that experimental colors have been sampled homogeneously with respect to discriminability). This assumption is reflected in the common practice of collapsing across trials with different target colors when estimating memory precision and other model parameters. Here we investigated whether or not this assumption is secure. To do so, we conducted delayed estimation experiments following standard practice with a memory load of one. We discovered that different target colors evoked response distributions that differed widely in dispersion and that these stimulus-specific response properties were correlated across observers. Subsequent experiments demonstrated that stimulus-specific responses persist under higher memory loads and that at least part of the specificity arises in perception and is eventually propagated to working memory. Posthoc stimulus measurement revealed that rendered stimuli differed from nominal stimuli in both chromaticity and luminance. We discuss the implications of these deviations for both our results and those from other working memory studies.

Perceptual estimates can be biased by previously seen stimuli in delayed estimation tasks. These biases are often toward the mean of the whole stimulus set. Recently, we demonstrated such a central tendency bias in delayed color estimation. In the Bayesian framework of perceptual inference, perceptual biases arise when noisy sensory measurements are combined with prior information about the world. Here, we investigate this idea in color perception by manipulating stimulus range and stimulus noise while characterizing delayed color estimates. First, we manipulated the experimental prior for stimulus color by embedding stimuli in collections with different hue ranges. Stimulus range affected hue bias: Hue estimates were always biased toward the mean of the current set. Next, we studied the effect of internal and external noise on the amount of hue bias. Internal noise was manipulated by increasing the delay between the reference and test from 0.4 to 4 s. External noise was manipulated by increasing the amount of chromatic noise in the reference stimulus, while keeping the delay between the reference and test constant at 2 s. Both noise manipulations had a reliable effect on the strength of the central tendency bias. Furthermore, there was a tendency for a positive relationship between variability of the estimates and bias in both noise conditions. In conclusion, observers are able to learn an experimental hue prior, and the weight on the prior can be manipulated by introducing noise in the estimation process.

Color-based object selection — for instance, looking for ripe tomatoes in the market — places demands on both perceptual and memory processes: it is necessary to form a stable perceptual estimate of surface color from a variable visual signal, as well as to retain multiple perceptual estimates in memory while comparing objects. Nevertheless, perceptual and memory processes in the color domain are generally studied in separate research programs with the assumption that they are independent. Here, we demonstrate a strong failure of independence between color perception and memory: the effect of context on color appearance is substantially weakened by a short retention interval between a reference and test stimulus. This somewhat counterintuitive result is consistent with Bayesian estimation: as the precision of the representation of the reference surface and its context decays in memory, prior information gains more weight, causing the retained percepts to be drawn toward prior information about surface and context color. This interaction implies that to fully understand information processing in real-world color tasks, perception and memory need to be considered jointly.

Summary Natural viewing challenges the visual system with images that have a dynamic range of light intensity (luminance) that can approach 1,000,000:1 and that often exceeds 10,000:1 [1, 2]. The range of perceived surface reflectance (lightness), however, can be well-approximated by the Munsell matte neutral scale (N 2.0/ to N 9.5/), consisting of surfaces whose reflectance varies by about 30:1. Thus, the visual system, must map a large range of surface luminance onto a much smaller range of surface lightness. We measured this mapping in images with a dynamic range close to that of natural images. We studied simple images that lacked segmentation cues that would indicate multiple regions of illumination. We found a remarkable degree of compression: at a single image location, a stimulus luminance range of 5905:1 can be mapped onto an extended lightness scale that has a reflectance range of 100:1. We characterized how the luminance-to-lightness mapping changes with stimulus context. Our data rule out theories that predict perceived lightness from luminance ratios or Weber contrast. A mechanistic model connects our data to theories of adaptation and provides insight about how the underlying visual response varies with context.