On the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC Layer Attacks: GTS Attack

Sokullu, Radosveta; Dağdeviren, Orhan; Korkmaz, Ilker

doi:10.1109/sensorcomm.2008.75

Cited by 38 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…However, if attackers cause interference during this process (e.g., by jamming), then ordinary nodes cannot register themselves for the guaranteed time slots and thus QoS of the application gets affected. This attack is called GTS attack [51].…”

Section: D/dos Attacks To the Physical Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of Internet of Things for a Reliable Internet of Services

Arış

Oktuğ

Voigt

2018

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of resource-constrained devices (e.g., sensors and actuators) which form low power and lossy networks to connect to the Internet. With billions of devices deployed in various environments, IoT is one of the main building blocks of future Internet of Services (IoS). Limited power, processing, storage and radio dictate extremely efficient usage of these resources to achieve high reliability and availability in IoS. Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks aim to misuse the resources and cause interruptions, delays, losses and degrade the offered services in IoT. DoS attacks are clearly threats for availability and reliability of IoT, and thus of IoS. For highly reliable and available IoS, such attacks have to be prevented, detected or mitigated autonomously. In this study, we propose a comprehensive investigation of Internet of Things security for reliable Internet of Services. We review the characteristics of IoT environments, cryptography-based security mechanisms and D/DoS attacks targeting IoT networks. In addition to these, we extensively analyze the intrusion detection and mitigation mechanisms proposed for IoT and evaluate them from various points of view. Lastly, we consider and discuss the open issues yet to be researched for more reliable and available IoT and IoS.

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Section: D/dos Attacks To the Physical Layermentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of Internet of Things for a Reliable Internet of Services

Arış

Oktuğ

Voigt

2018

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…At that time, the ZigBee family of protocols were solely layered on the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer standard. Some research, targeted solely at the 802.15.4 MAC layer, identified security concerns (see Sokullu, 2008;O'Flynn, 2011). Exploitation of these security issues could bring the link to the network down but would not provide access to application layer packet contents.…”

Section: Han Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Design of an Open Smart Energy Gateway for Smart Meter Data Management

Page

McParland

Piette

et al. 2015

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Executive SummaryWith the widespread deployment of electronic interval meters, commonly known as smart meters, came the promise of real-time data on electric energy consumption. Recognizing an opportunity to provide consumers access to their near real-time energy consumption data directly from their installed smart meter, we designed a mechanism for capturing those data for consumer use via an open smart energy gateway (OpenSEG). By design, OpenSEG provides a clearly defined boundary for equipment and data ownership.OpenSEG is an open-source data management platform to enable better data management of smart meter data. Effectively, it is an information architecture designed to work with the ZigBee Smart Energy Profile 1.x (SEP 1.x). It was specifically designed to reduce cyber-security risks and provide secure information directly from smart meters to consumers in near real time, using display devices already owned by the consumers. OpenSEG stores 48 hours of recent consumption data in a circular cache using a format consistent with commonly available archived (not real-time) consumption data such as Green Button, which is based on the Energy Services Provider Interface (ESPI) data standard. It consists of a common XML format for energy usage information and a data exchange protocol to facilitate automated data transfer upon utility customer authorization.

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“…In [25], R. Sokullu et al use ns-2 simulations to demonstrate GTS attacks on the 802.15.4 MAC, particularly in beacon-enabled mode. The GTS attacks were divided into four different scenarios: One Intelligent Attacker (OIA), One Random Attacker (ORA), Two Intelligent Attackers (TIAs), and Two Random Attackers (TRAs).…”

Section: Attacks On Beacon-enabled 802154 Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In contrast, the ORA and TRAs scenarios attack just one randomly chosen GTS. The main goal of the GTS attacks in [25] is to create collisions during the CFP to deny the use of GTSs.…”

Section: Attacks On Beacon-enabled 802154 Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to presenting different types of attacks compared to those discussed in [25], we implemented our attacks on real devices (i.e., Tmote Sky motes) rather than in simulation. This latter point is extremely important for 802.15.4 MAC layer attacks, because in addition to the challenge of accurately modeling physical layer interference, simulations do not take into account constraints imposed by the hardware, operating system, and applications, which can lead to simplified attack scenarios.…”

Section: Attacks On Beacon-enabled 802154 Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

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