On the historical origins of the contemporary notion of incommensurability: Paul Feyerabend’s assault on conceptual conservativism

Abstract

This paper investigates the historical origins of the notion of incommensurability in contemporary philosophy of science. The aim is not to establish claims of priority, but to enhance our understanding of the notion by illuminating the various issues that contributed to its development. Kuhn developed his notion of incommensurability primarily under the influence of Fleck, Polanyi, and Kö hler. Feyerabend, who had developed his notion more than a decade earlier, drew directly from Duhem, who had developed a notion of incommensurability in 1906. The idea is that in the course of scientific advance, when fundamental theories change, meanings change, which can result in a new conception of the nature of reality. Feyerabend repeatedly used this notion of incommensurability to attack various forms of conceptual conservativism. These include the logical positivistsÕ foundational use of protocol statements, HeisenbergÕs methodological principle that established results must be presupposed by all further research, attempts to separate philosophical accounts of ontology from physics, BohrÕs principle of complementarity, and logical empiricist accounts of reduction and explanation. Focusing on the function of the notion of incommensurability common to FeyerabendÕs various critiques explicates FeyerabendÕs early philosophy as a series of challenges to forms of conceptual conservativism.

El relativismo de Paul Karl Feyerabend

“…Prescribir de antemano unas reglas metodológicas para el movimiento científico no es sino un necio intento de construir un instrumento de medida sin considerar lo que se va a medir y en qué circunstancias (cf. Feyerabend 1978Feyerabend /19821987/2005.…”

“…De aquí que los participantes de una teoría se vean obligados a reconocer en una revolución científica que no pueden dominar, dadas las formas de racionalidad que tienen a su alcance, la nueva cosmovisión u ontología que supone la nueva teoría. Aún más, no pueden determinar si en una 4 Para un análisis de los ataques de Feyerabend contra el uso de las oraciones protocolares del positivismo lógico, la teoría de la reducción de Nagel y la teoría de la explicación de Hempel y Oppenhein, véase Oberheim (2005).…”

“…No es una argumentación abstracta y racional lo que guía la vida de la sociedad, sino que son sus mismos miembros inmersos en una situación histórica concreta quienes eligen, depuran y mejoran las tradiciones según el estilo de vida que quieren llevar (cf. /19821987a 710;1987/2005. Tampoco son los expertos o científicos especialistas los que deciden el curso de la sociedad.…”

Feyerabend and Popper on Theory Proliferation and Anomaly Import: On the Compatibility of Theoretical Pluralism and Critical Rationalism

“…Now, in order to evaluate this objection, it is of crucial importance to briefly recapitulate Feyerabend's stance on incommensurability. For Feyerabend, incommensurability is best characterized as semantic variance between comprehensive theories (Sankey and HoyningenHuene 2001, ix; for a detailed analysis of the history of the concept, see Oberheim [2005]). Incommensurability means conceptual incompatibility and not merely logical incompatibility (i.e., contradiction), which would actually presuppose conceptual compatibility.…”

“…To be sure, similar arguments appear in many passages of Feyerabend's later written work. (For an extended list of references, see Oberheim [2006], 246 n. 338.)…”