On the Distinction between Semantic and Conceptual Representation

Abstract

I address the problem of the distinction between semantic and conceptual representations from general considerations about how to distinguish a representational kind. I consider three different ways of telling representational kinds apart -in terms of structure, processing and content -and I examine if semantic representations may constitute a distinct kind with respect to each of them. I argue that the best options for semantic representation to be regarded as a distinct representational kind with respect to each of the three criteria conflict with each other, since it appears respectively as an atomic representation, as a sort of procedural rule or as a structured complex.

The Associative Structure of the Mental Lexicon: Hierarchical Semantic Relations in the Minds of Blind and Sighted Language Users

“…conceptual representations) (for discussion cf. Levinson, 1999;also Mikołajczak-Matyja, 2008, 2014Martínez-Manrique, 2010). On one hand, linguistic behaviour is an important source of information on conceptualisation because it "explicitly encodes and transmits conceptual information" (Pederson & Nuyts, 1999, p. 4).…”