On the Difficulty of Detecting Cognitive Uncertainty

Abstract

Uncertainty surely plays an important role in promoting and directing cognitive growth, but most investigations of children’s reasoning and problem solving have relied on procedures that are poorly suited to reveal the degree to which individuals are certain of the answers they endorse. We examine research on children’s reasoning in the context of obvious indeterminacy in order to assess whether simple modifications of the standard assessment procedures would allow us to monitor subjective certainty more reliably. It is concluded that when we set as our goal the measurement of judgment certainty, major changes in our testing methods are required. Two promising alternatives are considered, and it is hypothesized that once these new procedures are perfected and applied, we will discover that uncertainties are both prevalent and prolonged – that most of what seems to be known at any one time is actually understood only partially and therefore with some degree of uncertainty. It is argued that this is a natural and acceptable situation. Progress requires only a relative degree of confidence and not complete certainty. Persistent, vague uncertainties, on the other hand, provide continuous motivation and sensitization for further discoveries, growth, and development.

The Infinite Challenge: Levels of Conceiving the Endlessness of Numbers

“…Nor could many individuals be assigned a definite level of understanding. As with other concepts, and even more so, children and adults sway between conflicting ideas and they experience dissonances and internal contradictions (Acredolo & O'Connor, 1991;Falk & Wilkening, 1998). Mastering the strong concept of actual infinity does not come in one fell swoop (Siegler, 1986, pp.…”

Children's Probability Intuitions: Understanding the Expected Value of Complex Gambles

“…They often give definite answers even in indeterminate situations and this was initially taken to indicate difficulty with recognizing uncertainty (e.g., Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1980), but it later appeared that children's problem lies mainly with withholding judgment (e.g., Byrnes & Beilin, 1991;. Acredolo and O'Connor (1991) argued that this occurs because choice procedures discourage the expression and measurement of uncertainty. In contrast, with continuous judgment procedures, as used here, children express feelings of uncertainty in a natural manner and this enables them to display a higher level of competence.…”

The comparative study of metacognition: Sharper paradigms, safer inferences

“…Finally, these experiments could also help reveal the ontogenetic roots of human metacognition. The simple, nonverbal, perceptual tasks suitable for animals are more appropriate for young human children than are the complex, verbal, and introspective metacognitive assessments that young children normally fail (Acredolo & O’Connor, 1991; Brown et al, 1983). …”