On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism

Madison, B. J. C.

doi:10.1007/s12136-009-0054-4

Cited by 8 publications

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References 21 publications

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“…Bonjour's accessibility argument is a quick way to reach the incompatibilist thesis, but perhaps it is too quick . One charge against the simple accessibility argument, leveled by Chase (, 238), and more recently by Brent Madison (), is that the sense of internal availability (e.g., accessibility) precluded by content externalism in (1) is, as Chase puts it, ‘not the sense of internal availability at issue in characterizing J‐Internalism’. The incompatibilist conclusion (4) thus is dismissed as the product of illicit equivocation.…”

Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that Williamson (, 107–108) offers a similarly straightforward argument for the incompatibility of content externalism and epistemic internalism construed along mentalist lines, with the operative point being that Oscar and Twin Oscar can differ in their justified beliefs (given content externalism) despite being internal duplicates, a difference that Williamson takes to be incompatible with the mentalist claim that internal duplicates are justificational duplicates. It is interesting to note that Madison (, §3, esp. 180–2) objects to Williamson's argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with mentalist J‐internalism for essentially the same reasons (as we show) Chase sites in objecting to Bonjour's argument for the incompatibility of content externalism with accessibilist J‐internalism.…”

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Varieties of Externalism

Carter

Kallestrup

Palermos

et al. 2014

Philosophical Issues

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ABSTRACT. Our aim is to provide a topography of the relevant philosophical terrain with regard to the possible ways in which knowledge can be conceived of as extended. We begin by charting the different types of internalist and externalist proposals within epistemology, and we critically examine the different formulations of the epistemic internalism/externalism debate they lead to. Next, we turn to the internalism/externalism distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In light of the above dividing lines, we then examine first the extent to which content externalism is compatible with epistemic externalism; second, whether active externalism entails epistemic externalism; and third whether there are varieties of epistemic externalism that are better suited to accommodate active externalism. Finally, we examine whether the combination of epistemic and cognitive externalism is necessary for epistemology and we comment on the potential ramifications of this move for social epistemology and philosophy of science. INTRODUCTIONThe distinction between internalism and externalism is common to both contemporary philosophy of mind and contemporary epistemology, and it is the central topic of ongoing debates in both disciplines. To a certain extent this is unsurprising, given that these two theoretical domains are closely related in that they both focus on the study of cognitive phenomena.Despite the appearance of such common grounds, however, there are several differences between these two fields of study. Arguably, the most important one is that philosophy of mind studies cognition in a more inclusive way, by considering all kinds of mental states and processes (e.g., experience, beliefs, desires, emotions and so on), whereas epistemology focuses on the cognitive process of knowledge-acquisition and its cognates (e.g., belief and justification).Accordingly, it would be unsafe to assume that the internalism/externalism distinction maps on to both disciplines in the exact same way. And, indeed, it doesn't. Briefly stated, on the one hand, the internalism/externalism distinction, as it is normally construed within contemporary epistemology, refers to the debate over whether an agent's justification for believing a proposition p should always be (at least in principle) accessible to him by reflection alone. In other words, epistemic internalists hold that one's justification should always be internal to one's conscious mind, whereas epistemic externalists deny this claim.1 On the other hand, the standard way of thinking about the internalism/externalism debate within philosophy of mind is that internalists hold that cognitive processes and mental states reside exclusively within the agent's head, whereas externalists deny this on multiple grounds and with several degrees of departure from the internalist position.Embodied cognition theorists, for example, hold that several mental processes and states (e.g., experience, emotions and desires) may be constitutively dependent not only on the agent's brain but ...

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Section: Externalism In Philosophy Of Mind and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Externalism

Carter

Kallestrup

Palermos

et al. 2014

Philosophical Issues

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“…Along with Bonjour, Chase (2001), Vahid (2003), Williamson (2007), and Pritchard & Kallestrup (2004) have opted for incompatibilism, on various grounds. See however Brueckner (2002), Gerken (2008), Madison (2009) for some defences compatibilism. For the present purposes, we are not taking a stand on which 'side' of this debate has emerged victorious.…”

Section: Two Questions Of Incompatibilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…10 See here, for instance Chisholm (1977) and Bonjour (1985, ch. 2) for classic defences of the accessibilist position; for a recent overview, see also Madison (2010).…”

Section: The Incompatibility Thesis: Four Motivating Claimsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism

Carter

Palermos

2014

Erkenn

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Abstract. Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if 'active' externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind-e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses-are in principle incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the prima facie appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition nor the extended mind theses are in principle incompatible with two prominent versions of epistemic internalism-viz., accessibilism and mentalism. In fact, one possible diagnosis is that pretheoretical intuitions regarding the incompatibility of active externalism with epistemic internalism are symptomatic of a tacit yet incorrect identification of epistemic internalism with epistemic individualism. Thus, active externalism is not in principle incompatible with epistemic internalism per se and does not (despite initial appearances to the contrary) significantly restrict one's options in epistemology.

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“…For charges that content externalism and epistemic internalism are incompatible, see for example Pritchard and Kallestrup (2004); Williamson (2007). For replies that the two views are compatible, see for example Gerken (2008); Madison (2009).…”

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Epistemic Internalism

Madison

2010

Philosophy Compass

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The internalism ⁄ externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of knowledge and epistemic justification? It is generally held that if a positive epistemic status obtains, this is not a brute fact. Rather if a belief is, for example, justified, it is justified in virtue of some further condition(s) obtaining. What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, is that all the relevant factors that determine justification must be 'internal' (in a sense that needs to be specified). Epistemic externalism is the denial of internalism. Epistemic internalism about justification is the subject of this article. After introducing the central intuitive considerations that have tended to motivate internalism, this paper will explore different ways of construing the internalist position (or family of positions). In addition to classical formulations, more recent formulations will be discussed, concluding with a discussion of an emerging position known as 'Epistemological Disjunctivism', which its advocates claim preserves the most important features of more traditional forms of internalism, while avoiding their difficulties. Epistemological Disjunctivism is particularly worthy of attention since if true, it promises to bridge internalist and externalist epistemologies, bringing a rapprochement to two sides of what may otherwise appear a deep and intractable debate about the fundamental nature of epistemology.

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On the Compatibility of Epistemic Internalism and Content Externalism

Abstract: In this paper I consider a recent argument of Timothy Williamson's that epistemic internalism and content externalism are indeed incompatible, and since he takes content externalism to be above reproach, so much the worse for epistemic internalism. However,

Cited by 8 publications

References 21 publications

Varieties of Externalism

Varieties of Externalism

Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism

Epistemic Internalism

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