Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism

Carter, J. Adam; Palermos, S. Orestis

doi:10.1007/s10670-014-9670-5

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…Perhaps the most well studied distributed cognitive systems are Transactive Memory Systems where two or more individuals collaboratively store, encode and retrieve information, thereby forming a collective memory system much in the same way that you and your memory app would (Wegner 1987). The idea of distributed cognition, however, has also started gaining traction within philosophy of science, and especially with reference to scientific research teams (Giere 2002, Palermos 2015, and it is particularly amenable (though so far largely underexplored) to Web science (Palermos Forthcominga), and especially the case of Social Machines, such as Wikipedia-i.e., processes in which the people do the creative work and the machine does the administration (Berners-Lee et al 2002, 172) and which will enable to "do things we just couldn't do before" (Berners-Lee et al 2002, 174).…”

Section: Collective Responsibility In Cases Of Distributed Cognition mentioning

confidence: 99%

New Humans?

Carter

Clark

Palermos

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter focuses on extended cognition, a concept that invites the possibility of extended knowledge—i.e., knowledge that results from the close coupling of agents’ biological and technological equipment. It examines what is minimally required for such forms of technologically extended (and distributed) agents to be sufficiently justified and it asks whether existing and future technologies can allow for such forms of epistemic extension. Critical examination of the relevant literature at the intersection of philosophy of mind and epistemology suggests a positive response. Given this possibility, the chapter finally explores some of the ensuing transformations in the ethical obligations and rights of the resulting socio-technical systems and “new humans.”

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Section: Collective Responsibility In Cases Of Distributed Cognition mentioning

confidence: 99%

New Humans?

Carter

Clark

Palermos

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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“…This case then suggests that the knowledge-relevant normative status (given the procedures are established ones within the community: roughly, procedures which are taught, trained or simply encouraged-in the case of innate ones that are regarded as reliable; see fn.5-to be exploited by the community and which are being monitored in terms of their reliability, just as the members of the community are tacitly monitored for the correct exploitation of them). 23 Another way to disassociate epistemic internalism and individualism is offered by Carter and Palermos (2015), by exploiting an extended mind thesis. This is a controversial thesis which plays no role in the suggestion being made here.…”

Section: Manuscritomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Carter andPalermos 2015, Pritchard 2015b). But, of course, some might not find it plausible to think of this knowledge-relevant responsibility as a requirement that can be satisfied at the social level.…”

Section: Epistemic Interdependence and Anti-individualismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility

Brasi

2017

Manuscrito

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In contemporary epistemology, there are a number of particular internalism/externalism debates. My concern here is with the internalism/externalism controversy about some specific positive epistemic status required for knowledge which is normally understood in terms of epistemic responsibility. I argue that, given our pervasive epistemic interdependence, such particular debate needs to be reformulated in anti-individualistic terms if it is to be an interesting one. --

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“…Conee & Feldman ) tacitly embrace epistemic individualism in virtue of supposing ex ante that the mental states on which epistemic justification supervenes are not ( a la Clark and Chalmers ) extended mental states. See here Carter & Palermos () and Carter, et al () for further discussion.…”

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confidence: 98%

Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory

Carter

Kallestrup

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Abstract. The philosophical case for extended cognition is often made with reference to 'extended-memory cases' (e.g. Clark & Chalmers 1998); though, unfortunately, proponents of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) as well as their adversaries have failed to appreciate the kinds of epistemological problems extended-memory cases pose for mainstream thinking in the epistemology of memory. It is time to give these problems a closer look. Our plan is as follows: in §1, we argue that an epistemological theory remains compatible with HEC only if its epistemic assessments do not violate what we call 'the epistemic parity principle'. In §2, we show how the constraint of respecting the epistemic parity principle stands in what appears to be a prima facie intractable tension with mainstream thinking about cases of propositional memory. We then outline and evaluate in §3 several lines of response.Keywords: Extended cognition; propositional memory; knowledge; cognitive ability §1 Extended Cognition and Epistemic Parity Consider the following case, due to Clark & Chalmers (1998):Inga: Inga relies on her biological memory in a way that is perfectly normal; new information she learns is stored in her biological memory, which is also what she consults when she needs some old information.Two obvious observations are in order. First, Inga's biological memory is part of the cognitive process she employs in the ordinary course of storing and retrieving information. Secondly, Inga's biological memory is intracranial in that it is seated within her skin-and-skull.But now imagine that Inga's biological memory were instead somewhere outside her skull and skin, e.g., enclosed in a brain-in-a-vat that she carries around with her, playing the same role vis-à-vis stored and retrieved information as it usually does, intracranially, in the default case.While this would be a strange sight, we would surely not hesitate to include her portable biological brain as part of the cognitive process she employs in remembering the kinds of things she remembered before; her biological memory is after all playing the very same functional 2 role-viz., the role of being that which stores the new information she learns and the old information she retrieves. It would just be doing so in a way that goes beyond her bodily boundary. So, mere location can't be what matters. What then about implementation? Imagine that part of Inga's biological memory, say her dorsal premotor cortex, is replaced in the same location with a silicon-chip device which plays the same functional role in terms of storing and retrieving information. Again, we would not be reluctant to include that artificial implant as part of the cognitive process that she uses in remembering events that occurred before the surgery.So, actual constitution can't be what matters either. But now consider a combined case where part of a cognitive process is both constituted non-biologically and occurs outwith the skin-andskull. Here is Clark & Chalmers's (1998) case of 'Otto':Otto: Otto suffers from...

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Active Externalism and Epistemic Internalism

Cited by 12 publications

References 43 publications

New Humans?

New Humans?

Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility

Extended Cognition and Propositional Memory

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