On Schutz’s conception of science as one of multiple realities

Abstract

This article examines Alfred Schutz’s concept of ‘multiple realities’, and in particular, his portrayal of science as one of these realities. It is noted that, while this concept has been widely cited, it has often been interpreted in ways that are at odds with key features of Schutz’s original formulation. A careful assessment is made of the main article he wrote dealing with this topic, focusing on the respects in which the ‘multiple realities’ he discusses are held to differ. Particular attention is given to the relationship between science and what Schutz calls ‘the paramount reality’, that of ‘daily life’. It is suggested that there are some serious problems with the distinctions he makes and that these relate to an ambiguity in his position: that he starts from within phenomenological psychology, drawing on the work of Husserl and James, but moves in a more naturalistic and sociological direction in his account of ‘the world of daily life’. This raises some fundamental questions about the nature of phenomenology and its relationship to social science.

Alfred Schutz and ethnomethodology: Origins and departures

“…It seems to me that Schutz was clearly concerned with the orientation, or ‘attitude’, of scientists as exhibited in their activities, rather than with a set of abstract norms or ‘rationalisations’ – despite the fact that, as Lynch (2004: 27) points out, elsewhere (Schutz, 1945) he separates the scientific attitude from practical scientific activities (see Hammersley, 2017b). Dennis is also right to point out that Schutz does not present scientific rationality as completely different from, or as superior to, practical rationality.…”