On reconfigurable fabrics and generic side-channel countermeasures

Abstract

Abstract. The use of field programmable devices in security-critical applications is growing in popularity; in part, this can be attributed to their potential for balancing metrics such as efficiency and algorithm agility. However, in common with non-programmable alternatives, physical attack techniques such as fault and power analysis are a threat. We investigate a family of next-generation field programmable devices, specifically those based on the concept of time sharing, within this context: our results support the premise that extra, inherent flexibility in such devices can offer a range of possibilities for low-overhead, generic countermeasures against physical attack.

A Survey of Coarse-Grained Reconfigurable Architecture and Design

“…Second, the redundant resources can implement security check modules to avoid physical attacks and hardware trojans [166]. Countermeasures against physical attacks for reconfigurable cryptographic processors were proposed in References [167,168]; these used the characteristics of partial reconfiguration and time-multiplexed SRAM to improve the security. The method proposed in Reference [169] utilizes spatial and temporal randomizing reconfiguration as countermeasures for double fault attacks.…”