On Public–Private Partnership Performance

Abstract

Private finance-based infrastructure public–private partnerships (P3s) are globally popular, including renewed interest in the United States, but their performance remains contested. This article explores the meaning of P3 and the notion of P3 success, and points to multiple interpretations of both. It proposes a new conceptual model of the P3 phenomenon, including five levels of meaning: project, delivery method, policy, governance tool, and cultural context. Numerous criteria exist on which the success of P3 might be judged. These are as oriented toward politics and governance as they are toward more traditional utilitarian policy goals concerned with project delivery, or value for money (VfM). Indeed, governments have dozens of different goals in mind. Given mixed international results to date for VfM, it is posited that to the extent that infrastructure P3s continue to show popularity, governments may stress P3 success more on the basis of political and governance strengths, than utilitarian characteristics.

Reducing Risk in Public-Private Partnership Contracts

“…3Ps change the venue within which transportation infrastructure and services are delivered; but they do not eliminate the transportation agency's responsibility to the public. 3Ps can only work well if the government agency manages the partnership effectively and ensures continued private partner accountability (Hodge & Greve, 2017;Milward & Provan, 2003;Milward & Provan, 2000;Skelcher, 2010). Kearns (1996) coined the term 'accountability environment' to capture the complex nature of the public's search for accountable governance.…”

“…Another key to successful 3Ps is contractual flexibility to ensure that incentives and risks remain balanced over the life of the contract. The explicit sharing of risk is a key aspect of 3P projects (Hodge & Greve, 2017), and flexibility in the contract helps to curb financial risk for both public and private stakeholders, while maximizing public benefit (Schank, 2011). The flexibility to undo a poorly written contract, "should such undoing become necessary," is vitally important for all involved (Boarnet & Dimento, 2004, p. 30).…”

The Prospect of Infrastructure Public‐Private Partnerships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities

“…Modern governments are invariably under pressure to reform their public sectors, which are often described as inefficient and unresponsive to their citizens’ growing needs (Grossman, ; Sabry, ). Since the 1980s, the public administration literature has witnessed a mounting interest in public management reform and introduction of public‐private partnerships (PPPs) as an infrastructure delivery mechanism, particularly within the Anglo‐Saxon context (Biygautane, forthcoming; Hodge & Greve, ; Pollitt, ). However, the experiences of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which comprise Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, are often overlooked by international business and public administration scholars (Akoum, ; Goldsmith & Al‐Yahya, ).…”

A resource-based view on non-urban regional flourishing in Europe

“…In an in-depth review of the effectiveness of such partnerships, Hodge and Greve (2007) found that the results of long-term contracts related to infrastructure were mixed in terms of effectiveness and cost reduction. They also found that global social partnerships, such as projects for combating social exclusion and enhancing community development, due to a European Union policy, required effective maintenance control by the contracting partners.…”

“…Regarding investments in infrastructure, especially in the railroad, there is a need for long-term commitment by the municipality, especially as Töreboda is still a transport hub (Hodge and Greve, 2007).…”