The Prospect of Infrastructure Public‐Private Partnerships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar: Transforming Challenges into Opportunities

Abstract

tackle growing fi scal defi cits, these states are constrained by numerous governance-related, administrative, and regulatory challenges that make PPPs problematic. Effective implementation of the inherently complex and contractual PPP policy requires addressing the existing institutional, economic, bureaucratic, and cultural constraints within these three states. This article concludes with recommendations to mitigate these challenges, that require serious political will and sufficient time to yield positive results, and to attract international investors and contractors to the Gulf region.

Do Ownership Structure, Political Connections and Executive Compensation Have Multifaceted Effects on Firm Performance? An Alternative Approach

“…The interrelation among ownership and board characteristics in shaping governance and enhancing performance has been one of the most controversial topics in corporate governance literatures (Mikkelson, Partch, & Shah (1997); Dwivedi and Jain (2005)). Recently, most emerging markets in general and rich oil markets in particular are increasingly grappling with this issue as they seek to reform their governance mechanisms, especially after oil price drop with a view to giving a new role to the private sector in the economy and attracting foreign capital (Biygautane, Hodge, & Gerber, 2018).…”

Infrastructure Public–Private Partnerships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar

“…Recently, there has been growing contributions from continental Europe (Koppenjan, 2015; Teisman & Klijn, 2002), Scandinavia (Greve & Mörth, 2010; Petersen, 2010, 2011), Russia and Kazakhstan (Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2015), China (Ke, Jefferies, Shrestha, & Jin, 2014), India (Vedachalam, Geddes, & Riha, 2015), Latin America (Vives, Benavides, & Paris, 2008), and the Middle East (Al-Shareem, Yusof, & Kamal, 2015; Jamali, 2004; Mistarihi, Hutchings, & Shacklock, 2013). However, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ experiences have been overlooked in this literature (Biygautane, Hodge, & Gerber, 2016; Common, 2008; Pollitt, 2015). 1…”

Do We Need a GCC Bank to Facilitate the Economic Turnaround of the GCC Region?

“…Between 2011 and mid‐2014, oil prices swayed between $100 and $110 per barrel, which later swooped down to $48 per barrel in early 2017 (el‐Katiri, ). With the decline of oil prices in the mid‐2014, the oil‐dependent GCC region is planning market‐based reforms, such as downsizing the public sector, outsourcing, privatization, and public‐private partnerships (PPPs) (Biygautane, Hodge & Gerber, ). Some of the key recommendations for economic diversification in the GCC region pertain to improvement of liquidity management, development of a sound fiscal framework, promoting a fairly valued real effective exchange rate, promoting trade integration, streamlining government bureaucracy, promoting small and medium enterprises, promoting improvements in education, furthering investment in infrastructure, facilitating FDI in nonoil sectors, promoting horizontal and vertical integration across the value‐chains, promoting labor market competitiveness, and so forth (International Monetary Fund, 2016).…”

“…The first requirement for the institutionalization of a GCC bank relates to the requirement of a desired political will to move ahead with the formulation and implementation of the idea itself. The significance of politico‐administrative will while introducing any government reform in the context of economic diversification has been deemed to be very much relevant in the GCC case where the society and administration are closely intertwined (Biygautane et al, ). Therefore, the required political will for the institutionalization of a GCC bank includes the selection of the headquarters of the bank at a mutually convenient and unanimously agreed upon location that is easily accessible to all and has the required infrastructure to ensure the long‐term sustainability of the bank.…”