On Political Representation

Brennan, Geoffrey; Hamlin, Alan

doi:10.1017/s0007123499000058

Cited by 92 publications

(22 citation statements)

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“…Oba termíny jsou mnohovrstevnaté a chápání způsobu reprezentace se navíc v průběhu času dramaticky vyvíjí (srov. Brennan a Hamlin 1999;Mansbridge 2003;Brim a Dufek 2012). Nicméně obecně přijímanou, legislativně podpořenou a zde aplikovanou definicí je, že mandát vzniká zvolením -a pro skutečně komplexní chápání pojmu bych dodal, že i případným jmenováním -do legislativního, exekutivního či obecně zastupitelského orgánu a je spojen s reprezentací určité skupiny obyvatelstva, která skrze volbu, a to přímou i nepřímou, delegovala na zastupitele část svých rozhodovacích pravomocí.…”

Section: Pojmová Východiska a Kumulace Mandátůunclassified

Definice, příčiny a důsledky kumulace mandátů zákonodárci

Hájek¹

2016

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Section: Pojmová Východiska a Kumulace Mandátůunclassified

Definice, příčiny a důsledky kumulace mandátů zákonodárci

Hájek¹

2016

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“…Including morality as an expressive benefit brings the analysis of expressive behaviour in this paper to be much more in line with the approach taken by Brennan and Hamlin (1999). To simplify matters we set the welfare associated with a bad incumbent who prefers to extract rents at 0.…”

Section: The Bad Politician Prefers To Extract Rents In Period 1 and mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is a normatively negative view of expressive voting as it reinforces rational irrationality. An alternative, normatively positive view of expressive voting is provided by Brennan and Hamlin (1999) where they focus on the expressive selection of moral characteristics. We will consider both the negative and positive perspectives regarding expressive voting in this paper.…”

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confidence: 99%

The good, the bad and the populist: A model of political agency with emotional voters

Jennings

2011

European Journal of Political Economy

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This paper extends the political agency approach to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and 'expressive' and uninformed due to 'rational irrationality'. It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Initially the existence of only good and populist politicians is assumed and the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists are investigated and the implications for voter welfare are explored. The paper goes on to consider the inclusion of bad politicians. The paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides a rational choice analysis of populism as populism is commonly understood. Second, it locates a potential role for government as a persuasive provider of information regarding the quality of policy. Third, when bad politicians are added to the analysis it is found that a little bit of potential corruption could improve voter welfare.

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“…Further theoretical and empirical research is needed to identify the determinants of an individual's expressive preference order, and also of possible conflicts between expressive and 27 See, e.g., Brennan and Hamlin (1999). Generally, in theories of expressive voting, candidates are not necessarily associated with specific policies, but rather with likeable personal characteristics (Lomasky 2008: 477).…”

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confidence: 99%

Behavioral political economy: A survey

Schnellenbach

Schubert

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

123

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Explaining individual behavior in politics should rely on the same motivational assumptions as explaining behavior in the market: That's what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, those who played the game of politics should also be considered rational and selfinterested, unlike the benevolent despot of earlier models. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Assuming cognitive biases to be present in the market, but not in politics, behavioral economists often call for government to intervene in a "benevolent" way. Recently, however, political economists have started to apply behavioral economics insights to the study of political processes, thereby re-establishing a unified methodology. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of "Behavioral Political Economy" and considers the scope for further research. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D780, D030, A120, D720.

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On Political Representation

Abstract: An essential feature of political representation is that a mediating assembly is set between

Cited by 92 publications

References 0 publications

Definice, příčiny a důsledky kumulace mandátů zákonodárci

Definice, příčiny a důsledky kumulace mandátů zákonodárci

The good, the bad and the populist: A model of political agency with emotional voters

Behavioral political economy: A survey

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