On Metaepistemological Scepticism

Pritchard, Duncan; Ranalli, Christopher

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.003.0011

Intellectual Assurance 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198719632.003.0011

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On Metaepistemological Scepticism

Duncan Pritchard

Christopher Ranalli

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2022

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“…For alternative reconstructions of the conditionality problem, see Fernández-Vargas (2020),Pritchard and Ranalli (2016), and various essays inCoppenger and Bergmann (2016).…”

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confidence: 99%

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism

Echeverri

2022

Episteme

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Epistemological disjunctivism (ED) has been thought to solve the conditionality problem for epistemic externalism. This problem arises from externalists’ characterization of our epistemic standings as conditional on the obtaining of worldly facts which we lack any reflective access to. ED is meant to avoid the conditionality problem by explicating subjects’ perceptual knowledge in paradigmatic cases of perceptual knowledge via their possession of perceptual reasons that are both factive and reflectively accessible. I argue that ED's account of reflectively accessible factive perceptual reasons is also prey to the conditionality problem. After that, I submit that Stroud's influential formulation of the conditionality problem relies on a methodological requirement that is potentially dissociable from ED. So, it is possible to put ED in the service of a more modest anti-skeptical strategy. I close by suggesting that this modest anti-skeptical strategy successfully undercuts the underdetermination-based skeptical paradox. Nevertheless, it does not have substantial advantages over some forms of epistemic externalism.

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“…For alternative reconstructions of the conditionality problem, see Fernández-Vargas (2020),Pritchard and Ranalli (2016), and various essays inCoppenger and Bergmann (2016).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism

Echeverri

2022

Episteme

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On Metaepistemological Scepticism

Cited by 1 publication

References 20 publications

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism

Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Conditionality Problem for Externalism

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