On Measuring Legislative Agenda‐Setting Power

Abstract

We propose a typology for measuring agenda-setting success and failure in a legislative context. Our typology goes beyond the most commonly used measure ("rolls") and includes the full range of agenda-setting outcomes-rolls (opposing a proposal that subsequently passes), as well as "blocks" (opposing a proposal that is subsequently defeated), "successes" (supporting a proposal that subsequently passes), and "disappointments" (supporting a proposal that is subsequently defeated)-and thus takes into account instances of both positive and negative agenda power. We discuss these measures, and the theoretical questions surrounding them, with the hope of providing some guidance to scholars of the U.S. House, as well as those analyzing agenda power in other legislatures. As a first step in this direction, we explore variation in agenda-setting measures in 85 American state legislative chambersand Kanthak 2011; Jones and Hwang 2005). But if the agenda-setting institutions in these legislative bodies do not map well onto those in the U.S. House, the transition from theory to measure will suffer. Moreover, where theoretical innovation is sometimes hampered by the anticipation of measurement limitations, the over-focus on rolls as the measure of agenda control stunts the growth of agenda-setting theories beyond the U.S. House.In this article, we seek to loosen that restraint by proposing a typology for measuring legislative agenda-setting power. Our typology includes the full range of agenda-setting outcomes-rolls, as well as "blocks" (when an agenda setter opposes a proposal that is subsequently defeated), "successes" (when an agenda setter supports a proposal that subsequently passes), and "disappointments" (when an agenda setter

Rewarding Dysfunction: Interest Groups and Intended Legislative Failure

“…Rather than only focusing on bills that satisfy pivotal lawmakers, majority parties regularly forward proposals that are intended to fail. These bills are not “disappointments” for the majority party (Jenkins and Monroe ) and do not arise due to uncertainty about members' preferences. Instead, DOA bills reveal that sometimes the legislative agenda shifts from a lawmaking tool to a purely electioneering one.…”

Non-Party Government: Bipartisan Lawmaking and Party Power in Congress

“…52Cox and McCubbins 2005; Finocchiaro and Rohde 2008; Gailmard and Jenkins 2007; Jenkins and Monroe 2016.…”

“…53As Jenkins and Monroe 2016 demonstrate, party rolls are just one way to assess party influence and party support in a legislature. This is why we present rolls alongside other measures of minority party support.…”

Untitled

“…Asegurar la procreación y filiación homosexual no estaba dentro de sus preferencias políticas (Jenkins y Monroe, 2016), ya que ninguno propuso incluirlas en el proyecto de Acuerdo de Unión Civil, concentrándose solo en derechos patrimoniales.…”