On knowing how to do things: a theory of motor imagery

Abstract

The distinction between ' knowing how' and ' knowing that' is fundamental to current theories of cognition. Two distinct encodings or representations are implied, one conscious and verbalisable and the other normally unconscious yet demonstrable in behaviour. The paper discusses the nature of these two kinds of representation and relations between them. It is shown that imagery forms an essential mediating link between the two encodings and a theoretical model -the Action-Language-Imagination or ALl model -is presented. An important feature of the model is the role attributed to the motor system in generating imagery and principal features of motor imagery are reviewed in the context of the ALl model and with reference to recent experimental findings. Problems in mapping conscious representations of action onto physical brain mechanisms are briefly discussed. It is proposed that the physical basis of imaginal representations of actions is best understood in terms of the mechanisms of motor control. A two stage theory of motor imagery is proposed in which the first stage, the generation of a prototypical action is virtually identical to that involved in overt actions whilst the second stage depends on the retrieval of sensory impressions from memory.Keywords: Procedural/declarative knowledge; Motor imagery; Action prototype Procedural and declarative knowledgeThe distinction between two kinds of knowledge, ' knowing how' and ' knowing that' was made nearly half a century ago by the philosopher Ryle [15]. 'Knowing that' is evidenced by a verbal statement, for example I know that "the big wheel in the Prater pleasure gardens was designed and built by British engineers", whilst 'knowing how' is evidenced by performance, actually building the wheel. Ryle was attacking the 'dualist' theory that mental events belong to a separate ghostly world of knowledge comprised of propositions which act in some mysterious way to cause overt actions. He pointed out that although we can mentally rehearse an action before, or instead of, executing it this is by no means necessary. In fact it is sometimes quite difficult to explain verbally perfectly normal routine actions. The distinction between 'procedural' and 'declarative' knowledge' and the closely related distinction between 'implicit' and 'explicit' knowledge is familiar in the writings of recent cognitive psychologists such as Anderson [1]. Both sets of terms refer to the problem of representation. Declarative or explicit knowl-* Corresponding author. Fax: (44) (1203) edge is available to consciousness, and can readily be expressed verbally, whereas procedural or implicit knowledge is typically unconscious and can only be expressed verbally with some difficulty and sometimes not at all.Knowledge of either kind implies a representation and this symposium is about the representation of motor acts or, more generally, representations of procedural knowledge. The translation between procedural and declarative knowledge is required whenever it is necessary to explain a pro...

Motor imagery in typing: effects of typing style and action familiarity

“…Motor imagery is thought to rely on memories (Annett, 1996) or (from a computational viewpoint) on internal models of actions (Davidson & Wolpert, 2005). If the action is familiar, established internal models can be used for motor imagery.…”

Perceptual Integration of Illusory and Imagined Kinesthetic Images

“…In addition, although motor imagery has been assumed to be mediated by similar processes to those involved in motor preparation (Jeannerod, 1994;Jeannerod and Frak, 1999), the various descriptions of kinesthetic motor imagery published so far (Annett, 1995;Magill, 1998) emphasize the fact that "the person actually experiences the sensory sensations that might be expected in that situation" (Mulder, 2007). Motor imagery may therefore involve both the activation of an action plan and a "substitute for the sensory feedback" usually evoked by this action (Annett, 1996). Grush (2004) has suggested the existence of a "body emulator" receiving signals from the motor command and generating kinesthetic experiences during motor imagery.…”

“…Both actual and first-person imagined actions give rise to conscious kinesthetic perceptions which mainly result from proprioceptive inputs or the central simulation of a sensory experience in the case of motor imagery (Annett, 1996;Naito et al, 2002;Grush, 2004;Mulder, 2007). It has also been clearly established that the neural networks underlying simulated and actually executed actions overlap considerably (for review, see Jeannerod and Frak, 1999;Lotze and Halsband, 2006), that they both elicit almost identical autonomic responses (Decety et al, 1991(Decety et al, , 1993Wuyam et al, 1995), and that their timing is very similar (Decety and Michel, 1989;Parsons, 1994).…”

Differential modulation of corticospinal excitability during observation, mental imagery and imitation of hand actions

“…In another competing theory, Heyes (2001) emphasizes the existence of a set of bi-directional excitatory links between sensory and motor representations that are formed largely from correlated experiences of observing and executing actions. Likewise, theories of motor imagery have been embedded within the same conceptual framework with regard to the transformation of perceived or learned actions into motor images and motor performance (Annett, 1996;Jeannerod & Frak, 1999).…”