A true psychology of language and self requires a radically dialogical ontology that goes beyond the dialectics of self and other and the logic of me-other exchange. Bertau's notion of the inbetween and Lipari's notion of interlistening are highly suggestive of such a dialogical ontology. This article attempts to connect those notions to a history of genetic thought going back to Goethe's Lebensphilosophie. Following the implications of this tradition leads to a different interpretation of Vygotsky's work on thinking and concept formation than the one offered by Larraín and Haye. The article concludes by evoking Merleau-Ponty in further support of an ontology of the in-between that reveals expression both in its generativity and in its depth. With an allusion to Karsten, genuine depth can be seen as expressed precisely through a refraction of the self as expression and the self as expressed. The idea that both "self" and "language" are inherently dialogical is gradually gaining prominence within the psychological sciences. Whereas discursive psychologists in particular have embraced the idea of the rhetorical and constructive nature of selfhood for some time, more recently the dialogical nature of language itself has received more attention. The contributions to this special issue are particularly relevant in that regard, because they each attempt to engage the question of the relation between language and self in a living way, both by reinterpreting and juxtaposing historical sources, such as von Humboldt, Vygotsky, Bühler, Vološinov, and Bakhtin and by broadening the scope of a