On Incentive Compatible Competitive Selection Protocols

Abstract

The problem of selecting m best players out of n candidates, through pairwise comparisons, is considered. Deviating from the standard models, it is assumed in this article that the outcome of a pairwise comparison (e.g., a match between two candidates) may be manipulated by collaborating participants: The stronger party may intentionally lose to the weaker party in order to gain group benefit. We discuss protocol design issues for such scenarios, and develop both possibility and impossibility results.

Winning by Losing

“…In the third case, an advantage is gained in expected terms (any team has a lower probability of winning against Barcelona or Chelsea than against a weaker team). Also, Chen, Deng, and Liu (2011), Faliszewski (2008), and Russell and Walsh (2009) consider possibility of a collusion between several teams. In this article, our focus is on the possibility that a team is strictly better off by losing.…”