Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory

Kondratev, Aleksei Y.; Мазалов, Владимир

doi:10.1007/s00182-019-00681-5

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…7 Black's rule selects a Condorcet winner (aka pairwise majority winner) if it exists and a Borda winner otherwise. 8 The literature on strategic voting is prolific; see e.g., Kondratev and Mazalov (2019) and references therein. 9 In fact, they might be unable to even do this.…”

Section: Higher Majority Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this rule each group of voters can veto the share of candidates that is approximately the same as the share of this group. The rule selects the candidates that have not been vetoed by any group.7 Black's rule selects a Condorcet winner (aka pairwise majority winner) if it exists and a Borda winner otherwise.8 The literature on strategic voting is prolific; see e.g.,Kondratev and Mazalov (2019) and references therein. 9 In fact, they might be unable to even do this.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

Kondratev

Nesterov

2019

Public Choice

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We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority from dominating minorities: whether a voting rule makes a majority powerful, and whether minorities can veto the candidates they do not prefer. For a given voting rule, the minimal share of voters that guarantees a victory to one of their most preferred candidates is the measure of majority power, and the minimal share of voters that allows them to veto each of their least preferred candidates is the measure of veto power. We find tight bounds on these minimal shares for voting rules that are popular in the literature and in real elections. We order these rules according to majority power and veto power. The instant-runoff voting has both the highest majority power and the highest veto power and the plurality rule has the lowest. In general, the higher the majority power of a voting rule is, the higher its veto power. The three exceptions are: voting with proportional veto power, Black's rule, and Borda rule, which have a relatively low level of majority power and a high level of veto power and thus provide minority protection. Our results can shed light on how voting rules provide different incentives for voter participation and candidate nomination.

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Section: Higher Majority Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

Kondratev

Nesterov

2019

Public Choice

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Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game

Bergantiños,

Moreno-Ternero

2024

Int J Game Theory

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We study the cooperative game associated with a broadcasting problem (the allocation of revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting rights for a sports tournament). We show that the set of core allocations can be characterized with three axioms: additivity, null team and monotonicity. We also show that the Shapley value can be characterized with additivity, equal treatment of equals and core selection.

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Query complexity of tournament solutions

Maiti,

Dey

2024

Theoretical Computer Science

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Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory

Cited by 5 publications

References 54 publications

Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules

Axiomatic characterizations of the core and the Shapley value of the broadcasting game

Query complexity of tournament solutions

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