On endogenous growth with physical capital, human capital and product variety

Funke, Michael; Strulik, Holger

doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00072-5

Cited by 154 publications

(164 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Basu, 1996), while others hint slightly higher values, which can exceed 70 percent (e.g. Roeger, 1995;Funke and Strulik, 2000). Consistent with this, and also attending to the fact that our model considers quality driven R&D, which is usually associated to larger markups, in part due to the market power conferred by the patent system, we define an acceptable range for p of 1.4-1.6.…”

Section: A Typical Calibrationsupporting

confidence: 55%

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The Politics of Growth: Can Lobbying Raise Growth and Welfare?

Júlio¹

2009

SSRN Journal

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This paper aims at analyzing the effects of lobbying over economic growth and primarily welfare. We model explicitly the interaction between policy-makers and firms in a setup where the latter undertakes political contributions to the former in exchange for more restrictive market regulations which induce exit and enhance the profitability of the market. In a sectorial equilibrium, despite stimulating growth, lobbying restricts the market structure and reduces welfare when compared to the free-entry outcome. However, once general equilibrium considerations are taken into account, we find that lobbying may improve welfare over a welfare maximizing free-entry equilibrium, by means of an expansion in aggregate demand. This introduces a new paradigm in the literature about the effects of lobbying over economic performance.JEL classification: D72, L13, O31.

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Section: A Typical Calibrationsupporting

confidence: 55%

“…Strulik, 2007;Funke and Strulik, 2000), we set the benchmark value for the elasticity of marginal utility (σ) to 2. According to the general equilibrium condition (38), this implies an intertemporal discount factor of 0.049.…”

Section: A Typical Calibrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Politics of Growth: Can Lobbying Raise Growth and Welfare?

Júlio¹

2009

SSRN Journal

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“…However, it accounts for the fact that human capital is a key ingredient to make research which is established for years in economic literature: for instance, Nelson and Phelps (1966) explain that education facilitates adoption and implementation of new technologies. It has been used by several authors in R&D-based models with human capital accumulation (see Arnold, 1998;Funke and Strulik, 2000;Blackburn et al, 2000;Dalgaard and Kreiner, 2001;Strulik, 2005). The idea is that individuals are not skillful researchers by birth.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why can an environmental policy tax promote growth through the channel of education?

Grimaud

Tournemaine

2007

Ecological Economics

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This paper examines the implications of an environmental policy for growth performances. We develop a model where growth is driven by human capital accumulation. Firms invest in research to develop new technologies to reduce their pollution emissions and education is treated as product which not only enhances the productivity of individuals but also enters in their preferences. We find that a tighter environmental policy can promote growth. The reason is that a higher tax on pollution drives the prices of goods whose production is polluting up. This, in turn, enhances the willingness of individuals to acquire education.

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“…Our main theoretical finding suggests that increasing longevity positively affects technological progress and therefore productivity growth. Intuitively, a decrease in the rate of mortality implies that households expect to live longer and therefore they discount the 1 See, for example, Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Jones (1995), Kortum (1997), Peretto (1998), Segerström (1998), Young (1998), Howitt (1999), Funke and Strulik (2000), Strulik (2005), Bucci (2008), Strulik et al (2013), and many others. Note that in frameworks with diminishing returns to capital, the effects of population aging on per capita output growth can only be transient (see Solow, 1956;Cass, 1965;Diamond, 1965;Koopmans, 1965;Gruescu, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Longevity and Technological Change

Gehringer

Prettner

2017

Macroecon. Dynam.

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe analyze the impact of increasing longevity on technological progress within an R&D-based endogenous growth framework and test the model's implications on OECD data from 1960 to 2011. The central hypothesis derived in the theoretical part is that -by raising the incentives of households to invest in physical capital and in R&D -decreasing mortality positively impacts upon technological progress and thereby also on productivity growth. The empirical results clearly confirm the theoretical prediction which implies that the ongoing demographic changes in industrialized economies are not necessarily detrimental to economic prosperity, at least as far as technological progress and productivity growth are concerned.

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On endogenous growth with physical capital, human capital and product variety

Cited by 154 publications

References 15 publications

The Politics of Growth: Can Lobbying Raise Growth and Welfare?

The Politics of Growth: Can Lobbying Raise Growth and Welfare?

Why can an environmental policy tax promote growth through the channel of education?

Longevity and Technological Change

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