We consider a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth with creative destruction in which we introduce a non-renewable natural resource. We characterize the optimum and the equilibrium paths, and we derive the precise levels of economic policy instruments that allow the implementation of the optimum. Moreover, we study the effects of these policies on the relevant steady-state variables, in particular the rate of extraction of the resource.

No abstract

Polluting non-renewable resources, Growth, Environmental policy, Bias of technical change, O32, O41, Q20, Q32,

We analyze the impact of the pollution generated by the use of non-renewable resources on the standard results of growth models. In this context, we obtain a Hotelling rule which is not a pure efficiency condition any longer. Subsequently, we show that some of the optimal paths' standard properties change: in particular, an increase in the households' psychological discount rate leads to a slower extraction of the resource. Moreover, we present a simple endogenous growth model that allows us to study the effects of an environmental policy aimed at correcting the distortion introduced at the equilibrium. We show that the tax level does not matter, and that a decreasing tax on the resource use yields the optimum.

This paper examines the implications of an environmental policy for growth performances. We develop a model where growth is driven by human capital accumulation. Firms invest in research to develop new technologies to reduce their pollution emissions and education is treated as product which not only enhances the productivity of individuals but also enters in their preferences. We find that a tighter environmental policy can promote growth. The reason is that a higher tax on pollution drives the prices of goods whose production is polluting up. This, in turn, enhances the willingness of individuals to acquire education.

The paper considers a growth model with climate change and three R&D sectors dedicated to energy, backstop and CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) efficiency.First, we characterize the set of decentralized equilibria: to each vector of public tools, a carbon tax and a subsidy to each R&D sector, is associated a particular equilibrium. Second, we solve the first-best optimum problem and we implement it by computing the vector of optimal tools. Finally, we illustrate the theoretical model using some calibrated functional specifications. In particular, we investigate the effects of various combinations of public policies (including the optimal ones) by determining the deviation of each corresponding equilibrium from the "laisser-faire" benchmark.JEL classification: H23, O32, Q43, Q54, Q55.

This paper discusses some important issues that feed the debate on the notion of Universal Service, namely, its de¢nition, justi¢cation, cost and ¢nancing, within a uni¢ed economic framework. In view of the diversity of both the historical and forward looking situations under which the implementation of universal service is envisioned, we provide a systematic analysis of the economic trade-o¡s associated with various scenarios.We also draw on some actual universal service experiences that have reached some appreciable level of maturity, most notably in telecommunications and postal services, to illustrate and sometimes ¢ne tune some of our arguments.

A radical evolution of intellectual property law and practices has followed the rise in importance of new technology industries. Many patents today directly protect knowledge. We endeavour to account for this evolution in a simple R&D-based growth model. To deal with the non-convexity property of technologies in which knowledge is an input and fund research privately, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium with Cournot competition and free entry where knowledge is exchanged on competitive micro-markets that can be subject to imperfect exclusion. JEL Classification: O31, O34.