On Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections with Linear Work

Weber, Stefan; Araújo, Roberto; Buchmann, Johannes

doi:10.1109/ares.2007.108

Cited by 30 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Moreover, it includes a timestamp in the tuple that the voter submits and a further mix step in the tallying phase. The latter improvements, though, are irrelevant as pointed out by Weber et al [26].…”

Section: Smith's Comparison Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 87%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Practical and Secure Coercion-Resistant Scheme for Internet Voting

Araújo

Foulle

Traoré

2010

Towards Trustworthy Elections

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson (JCJ) proposed at WPES 2005 the first voting scheme that considers real-world threats and that is more realistic for Internet elections. Their scheme, though, has a quadratic work factor and thereby is not efficient for large scale elections. Based on the work of JCJ, Smith proposed an efficient scheme that has a linear work factor. In this paper we first show that Smith's scheme is insecure. Then we present a new coercion-resistant election scheme with a linear work factor that overcomes the flaw of Smith's proposal. Our solution is based on the group signature scheme of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (Crypto 2004).

show abstract

Section: Smith's Comparison Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…Also, it corrects some problems observed by Smith in JCJ scheme. Weber et al [26], however, pointed out problems of Smith's proposal and presented a protocol that combines the ideas of JCJ with a variant of Smith's mechanism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Practical and Secure Coercion-Resistant Scheme for Internet Voting

Araújo

Foulle

Traoré

2010

Towards Trustworthy Elections

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In our work, we follow the scheme of many previous protocols using homomorphic encryption to ensure universal verifiability and unlinkability of ballots [1,7,8,11,28,16], which naturally lends itself to threshold cryptography, affording us a greater level of assurance against corrupted talliers. These protocols, along with some of those already mentioned, require, for remote voting, that the voter is not observed at the "very moment of voting" [18].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many electronic voting protocols [24,10,16,9,28] rely on anonymous channels, or anonymous and untappable channels [19], to satisfy some security properties. When considering voting over the Internet (an inherently insecure medium), one needs to think about how an anonymous channel could be implemented in the first place.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Remote Electronic Voting with Revocable Anonymity

Smart

Ritter

2009

Information Systems Security

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We present a new remote, coercion-free electronic voting protocol which satisfies a number of properties previously considered contradictory. We introduce (and justify) the idea of revocable anonymity in electronic voting, on the grounds of it being a legal requirement in the United Kingdom, and show a method of proving the validity of a ballot to a verifier in zero knowledge, by extension of known two-candidate proofs.

show abstract

“…(This interpretation is compatible with our definition of coercion-resistance provided in Section 3.) After the scheme was published, several proposals for improvements followed [24,27,3], of which only the last one succeeds in maintaining coercion-resistance. However, as the improvements in [3] only pertain to efficiency, they are not relevant to our approach.…”

Section: Anonymous Credentials: Juels Et Almentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards long-term free and secret electronic elections providing voter-verifiability in the bulletin board model

Langer

Volkamer²,

Weber

et al. 2009

Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Theory and Practice of Electronic Governance

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

From a legal point of view, freedom and secrecy of the vote are as important as transparency and verifiability of the election. However, it is a challenge to reconcile the corresponding requirements for electronic voting schemes. This paper analyzes the link between individual verifiability on the one hand and anonymity, receipt-freeness and coercionresistance on the other hand. We approach the issue by analyzing remote as well as paper-based cryptographic voting schemes which make use of public bulletin boards. We investigate to which extent the considered protocols meet the above requirements, especially in the long term when computational assumptions may no longer hold. We also give ideas on how to improve the protocols in this respect. The paper aims at providing an overview in order to support election hosts such as companies, associations and government agencies in selecting appropriate e-voting schemes with respect to the priority of either freedom and secrecy of the vote or voter-verifiability.

show abstract

On Coercion-Resistant Electronic Elections with Linear Work

Abstract: Abstract

Cited by 30 publications

References 20 publications

A Practical and Secure Coercion-Resistant Scheme for Internet Voting

A Practical and Secure Coercion-Resistant Scheme for Internet Voting

Remote Electronic Voting with Revocable Anonymity

Towards long-term free and secret electronic elections providing voter-verifiability in the bulletin board model

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About