On Bradley’s preservation condition for conditionals

Douven, Igor

doi:10.1007/s10670-007-9043-4

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 23 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…Douven () (addressing, actually, Richard Bradley's Preservation Condition, on which more in Appendix A) suggests we may be misled into thinking this by the fact that an indicative conditional

A \to C

(whose logical form is, suppose, simply

\neg A \lor C

) conventionally implicates that the probability of C given A is high. This might be able to explain the linguistic data mentioned in the prior paragraph.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals

Charlow

2015

Nous

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“…Douven () (addressing, actually, Richard Bradley's Preservation Condition, on which more in Appendix A) suggests we may be misled into thinking this by the fact that an indicative conditional

A \to C

(whose logical form is, suppose, simply

\neg A \lor C

) conventionally implicates that the probability of C given A is high. This might be able to explain the linguistic data mentioned in the prior paragraph.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Voices like Weatherson (ms); Douven () notwithstanding. Weatherson presciently connects the issues here to those surrounding Euclideanness, remarking that “As a general rule, the principle

⋄ q \to □ ⋄ q

is wildly implausible when

⋄

is epistemic might .” But I take Yalcin () to have shown that Weatherson was wrong about this principle.…”

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confidence: 99%

Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals

Charlow

2015

Nous

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“…Apart from Adams, whose opposition to the view that conditionals have truth conditions was already noted, these include Gibbard (1981), Appiah (1985), Edgington (1986Edgington ( , 1995Edgington ( , 2000, Bradley (2000), and Bennett (2003, Ch. 7); see Douven (2007b) for a reply to Bradley. 38 Which is of course not the same as saying that it will solve each of the problems that authors have shown to beset the Jackson/Lewis theory.…”

Section: The Evidential Support Theory Of Conditionalsmentioning

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The evidential support theory of conditionals

Douven

2007

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According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/ acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically significant relation between the conditional's antecedent and its consequent. This paper points to some linguistic data that our current best theories of the foregoing type appear unable to explain. Further, it presents a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming. The theory is then defended against some seemingly obvious objections.Keywords Conditionals · Probability · Semantics · Bayesian epistemology According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically relevant relation between the conditional's antecedent and its consequent. It is the working hypothesis of this paper that some such theory is correct at least for indicative conditionals. However, below I will point to some linguistic data that our current best epistemic theories of conditionals appear unable to explain. I further present a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming and that also seems to withstand further scrutiny.As a preliminary point, I should note that the present paper's main focus will be on simple indicative conditionals, that is, indicative conditionals the antecedents and consequents of which do not contain conditionals, and then chiefly on the assertability/ acceptability conditions of those conditionals, and not so much on their truth conditions (if they have any). Also, I will leave compounds of conditionals undiscussed. This is not much of an omission if those are right who have argued that a substantial part of the embedded conditionals we encounter in daily speech can be reduced to I. Douven (B)

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Against Preservation

Mandelkern¹,

Khoo

2018

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Bradley (2000) offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.

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On Bradley’s preservation condition for conditionals

Cited by 4 publications

References 23 publications

Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals

Triviality For Restrictor Conditionals

The evidential support theory of conditionals

Against Preservation

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