Against Preservation

Mandelkern, Matthew; Khoo, Justin

doi:10.1093/analys/any051

Analysis

2018

DOI: 10.1093/analys/any051

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Against Preservation

Matthew Mandelkern¹,

Justin Khoo

Abstract: Bradley (2000) offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.

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Cited by 4 publications

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“… See Edgington, 1995;DeRose, 2010;Khoo & Santorio, 2018 for discussion of the error theories proposed byLewis (1976) andJackson (1979); seevon Fintel and Gillies, 2015;Khoo & Santorio, 2018;Mandelkern, 2018;Ciardelli, 2021 for discussion of an error theory based on Kratzer's restrictor view.6 Though they, too, have been challenged: seeMandelkern and Khoo (2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

Probabilities of conditionals: Updating Adams

Ciardelli

Ommundsen

2022

Nous

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The problem of probabilities of conditionals is one of the long‐standing puzzles in philosophy of language. We defend and update Adams' solution to the puzzle: the probability of an epistemic conditional is not the probability of a proposition, but a probability under a supposition.Close inspection of how a triviality result unfolds in a concrete scenario does not provide counterexamples to the view that probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities: instead, it supports the conclusion that probabilities of conditionals violate standard probability theory.This does not call into question probability theory per se; rather, it calls for a more careful understanding of its role: probability theory is a theory of probabilities of propositions; but as conditionals do not express propositions, their probabilities are not subject to the standard laws.We argue that both conditional probabilities and probabilities of conditionals are best understood in terms of the dynamics of supposing, modeled as a restriction operation on a probability space. This version of the suppositionalist view allows us to connect Adams' Thesis to the widely held restrictor view of the semantics of conditionals.We address two common objections to Adams' view: that the relevant probabilities are ‘probabilities only in name’, and that giving up conditional propositions puts us at a disadvantage when it comes to interpreting compounds.Finally, we argue that some putative counterexamples to Adams' Thesis can be diagnosed as fallacies of probabilistic reasoning: they arise from applying to conditionals laws of standard probability theory which are invalid for them.

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confidence: 99%

Probabilities of conditionals: Updating Adams

Ciardelli

Ommundsen

2022

Nous

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The spectre of triviality

Charlow

2019

Analysis

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Abominable KK Failures

Dorst

2019

Mind

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KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of KK will lead to the knowability and assertability of abominable indicative conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know it, p’. Such conditionals are manifestly not assertable—a fact that KK defenders can easily explain. I survey a variety of KK-denying responses and find them wanting. Those who object to the knowability of such conditionals must either (i) deny the possibility of harmony between knowledge and belief, or (ii) deny well-supported connections between conditional and unconditional attitudes. Meanwhile, those who grant knowability owe us an explanation of such conditionals’ unassertability—yet no successful explanations are on offer. Upshot: we have new evidence for KK.

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Against Preservation

Cited by 4 publications

References 16 publications

Probabilities of conditionals: Updating Adams

Probabilities of conditionals: Updating Adams

The spectre of triviality

Abominable KK Failures

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