On being and holding responsible

Maher, Chauncey

doi:10.1080/13869791003759955

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 6 publications

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“…There have been some promising attempts to reply to the Reductio Objection that I will not discuss here (see Maher 2010;McKenna 2012, chap. 2).…”

Section: Responsibility and Blame / 21mentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding Responsibility in Appropriate Blame

Menges¹

2017

American Philosophical Quarterly

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When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson’s "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections.

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“…There have been some promising attempts to reply to the Reductio Objection that I will not discuss here (see Maher 2010;McKenna 2012, chap. 2).…”

Section: Responsibility and Blame / 21mentioning

confidence: 99%

Grounding Responsibility in Appropriate Blame

Menges¹

2017

American Philosophical Quarterly

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Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman

Mesel

2018

J Ethics

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Moral Responsibility and Merit

King

2017

JESP

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In the contemporary moral responsibility debate, most theorists seem to be giving accounts of responsibility in the "desert-entailing sense." Despite this agreement, little has been said about the notion of desert that is supposedly entailed. In this paper I propose an understanding of desert sufficient to help explain why the blameworthy and praiseworthy deserve blame and praise, respectively. I do so by drawing upon what might seem an unusual resource. I appeal to so-called Fitting-Attitude accounts of value to help inform a conception of desert or merit, one that can be usefully applied to discussions of moral responsibility. I argue that the view, which I call, Desert as Fittingness (or DAF), merits additional attention. I do so by making two claims: First, that it does better than extant Fitting Attitude accounts of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness; second, that it has an initial plausibility with respect to informing a general account of desert. While these reasons are insufficient to show the view is true, they do make the case for taking the view seriously.

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On being and holding responsible

Cited by 4 publications

References 6 publications

Grounding Responsibility in Appropriate Blame

Grounding Responsibility in Appropriate Blame

Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman

Moral Responsibility and Merit

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