Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman

Mesel, Benjamin De

doi:10.1007/s10892-018-9264-6

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Although Strawson embraces a form of compatibilism in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, he does not offer a clear path from the reversal to compatibilism (that is, a defense of premise (2) in the argument outlined above), mainly because, as Wiggins remarks, he thought it too obvious that the reversal claim would lead to compatibilism. However, in other works, often neglected in discussions of Strawson's view (but see Campbell, ; Coates, ; De Mesel, ; De Mesel ), Strawson sketches compatibilist replies to both leeway and source incompatibilists who accept the criterion thesis. We believe that a thorough exploration of these replies, which we cannot offer here, will help those who seek a path from the reversal claim to a plausible form of Strawsonian compatibilism.…”

Section: Incompatibilism and The Criterion Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

Mesel

Heyndels

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Strawsonians about moral responsibility often claim that our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, rather than the other way round. Many have argued that such ‘reversal’ claims have an unwelcome consequence: If our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, does this not imply, absurdly, that if we held severely mentally ill people responsible, they would be responsible? We provide a new Strawsonian answer to this question, and we explore the relation between reversal claims and (in)compatibilism.

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Section: Incompatibilism and The Criterion Thesismentioning

confidence: 99%

The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

Mesel

Heyndels

2019

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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“…22For other examples of how the rest of Strawson's oeuvre helps to understand ‘Freedom and Resentment’, see Campbell (2017), Coates (2017), Heyndels (2019), and some of my own work (De Mesel, 2017, 2018a, 2018b; De Mesel & Heyndels, 2019). …”

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P. F. Strawson was neither an externalist nor an internalist about moral responsibility

Mesel

2020

European J of Philosophy

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Internalism about moral responsibility is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's mental states; externalism is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's overt behaviour and by circumstances external to the agent. In a series of papers, Michelle Ciurria has argued that most if not all current accounts of moral responsibility, including Strawsonian ones, are internalist. Ciurria defends externalism against these accounts, and she argues that, in contrast to his contemporary followers, P.F. Strawson himself was an externalist. I believe that Ciurria's reading of Strawson is problematic. The aim of this paper is to elucidate Strawson's position with regard to the internalism‐externalism issue against the background of Ciurria's reading of him. I conclude that Strawson was neither an internalist nor an externalist about moral responsibility. I draw extensively upon the whole body of Strawson's work, much of which is sadly neglected in discussions of ‘Freedom and Resentment’, although it illuminates many of the issues discussed there.

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Being and holding responsible: Reconciling the disputants through a meaning-based Strawsonian account

Mesel

2021

Philos Stud

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Moral Responsibility and the Moral Community: Another Reply to Zimmerman

Cited by 4 publications

References 15 publications

The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

P. F. Strawson was neither an externalist nor an internalist about moral responsibility

Being and holding responsible: Reconciling the disputants through a meaning-based Strawsonian account

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