P. F. Strawson was neither an externalist nor an internalist about moral responsibility

Abstract

Internalism about moral responsibility is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's mental states; externalism is the view that moral responsibility is determined primarily by an agent's overt behaviour and by circumstances external to the agent. In a series of papers, Michelle Ciurria has argued that most if not all current accounts of moral responsibility, including Strawsonian ones, are internalist. Ciurria defends externalism against these accounts, and she argues that, in contrast to his contemporary followers, P.F. Strawson himself was an externalist. I believe that Ciurria's reading of Strawson is problematic. The aim of this paper is to elucidate Strawson's position with regard to the internalism‐externalism issue against the background of Ciurria's reading of him. I conclude that Strawson was neither an internalist nor an externalist about moral responsibility. I draw extensively upon the whole body of Strawson's work, much of which is sadly neglected in discussions of ‘Freedom and Resentment’, although it illuminates many of the issues discussed there.

Ordinary Language Philosophy as an Extension of Ideal Language Philosophy. Comparing the Methods of the Later Wittgenstein and P.F. Strawson

“…On Strawson's method in 'Freedom and Resentment', see Heyndels (2019). I have argued in a series of papers that 'Freedom and Resentment' is deeply Wittgensteinian; see De Mesel (2018Mesel ( , 2021aMesel ( , 2021b. For another Wittgensteinian reading of 'Freedom and Resentment', see Bengtson (2019).…”