On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance International Relations Research and Methodology

Abstract

This article moves from deconstruction to reconstruction in research methodology. It proposes pragmatism as a way to escape from epistemological deadlock. We first show that social scientists are mistaken in their hope to obtain warranted knowledge through traditional scientific methods. We then show that pragmatism has grown from tacit commonsense to an explicit item on the agenda of the international relations discipline. We suggest that a coherent pragmatic approach consists of two elements: the recognition of knowledge generation as a social and discursive activity, and the orientation of research toward the generation of useful knowledge. To offer a concrete example of what pragmatic methodology can look like, we propose the research strategy of abduction. We assess various forms of research design to further elucidate how pragmatic research works in practice.

A tale of two cognitions: The Evolution of Social Constructivism in International Relations

“…It remains to be seen, for instance, how the practice turn and its way of reasoning influences constructivist evolution, perhaps more toward pragmatism (e.g. Friedrichs andKratochwil 2009), or whether McCourt (2016) is correct in practice theory and relationalism forming the new constructivism. At least, by making distinctions in cognitions and genera, we can leave behind the unconstructive infighting over the "right" kind of constructivism.…”

What is the value of security? Contextualising the negative/positive debate

“…Methodologically, pragmatism emphasises abduction and starting at the middle level, instead of starting from abstract theoretical principles or inferring propositions 22 ! from facts 72 . In this way, we can analyse when human beings experience security as a ÔgoodÕ (and vice versa).…”

Neither “Mind” nor “Things” but Acting: Some Philosophical Implications of Pragmatism for International Relations Inquiry

“…This implies that the subject is implicated in the constitution of the object and therefore it is not possible to derive concepts directly 'the world' (or 'the facts'). Thus, since there is no 'world out there', the categories used to understand it do not come from objects but from the mind (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). …”

“…However, as stated above, what is perceived as the world cannot be separated from the concepts and theories of the observer. This certainly does not deny the existence of a reality but it does stress that if the observed is constituted by the observer, there cannot be a test against it 21 (Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009). …”

“…It argues that a pragmatist approach can enhance the rigor in International Relations research by 1 The case in favor of a pragmatist philosophy of social science has been pursued from different angles (see e.g. Cochran 2002Cochran , 2012Friedrichs & Kratochwil, 2009;Putnam, 2002). Thus, the argument set forth here seeks to, however briefly, contribute to that body of literature by contrasting the convention and the alternative, by building on those insights.…”