On a Woman’s “Responsibility” for the Fetus

Silverstein, Harry S.

doi:10.5840/soctheorpract19871319

Cited by 32 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…12 There is the 10 The first is the mother's health being endangered. 11 This is known as the "responsibility argument," or the "responsibility objection" to abortion, and has been defended and disputed within the philosophical literature [24][25][26][27][28][29]. 12 The abundance of forms of female contraception does not necessarily equate to (greater) control over the use of contraception.…”

Section: Contraceptive Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If pain or amputation did occur in those cases, it would be attributed to error on the part of the physician, or even negligence if appropriate care was not taken. Likewise, in a world in which male LARCuse is expected, a woman's need for an abortion might be seen to result from the failure of another person's attempt to prevent impregnation, or, if no contraception was used, another person's negligence 27. While one might argue that a woman should still check that a man has contracepted, it is surely not acceptable to expect one group of people to take27 Note that these arguments have no effect on the moral permissibility of abortions which occur in women for whom the pregnancy was at some point wanted, but later becomes unwanted.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Towards responsible ejaculations: the moral imperative for male contraceptive responsibility

Shahvisi

2020

J Med Ethics

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In this paper, I argue that men should take primary responsibility for protecting against pregnancy. Male long-acting reversible contraceptives are currently in development, and, once approved, should be used as the standard method for avoiding pregnancy. Since women assume the risk of pregnancy when they engage in penis-in-vagina sex, men should do their utmost to ensure that their ejaculations are responsible, otherwise women shoulder a double burden of pregnancy risk plus contraceptive burden. Changing the expectations regarding responsibility for contraception would render penis-in-vagina sex more equitable, and could lead to a shift in the discourse around abortion access. I describe the sex-asymmetries of contraceptive responsibility and of the risks associated with pregnancy, and offer arguments in favour of men taking primary responsibility for contraception. My arguments centre on (a) analogies between contraception and vaccination, and unwanted pregnancy and disease; (b) a veil-of-ignorance approach, in which I contend that if a person were not told their sex, they would find a society in which men were expected to acquire and use effective contraceptives the fairest arrangement for everyone.

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Section: Contraceptive Asymmetrymentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

Towards responsible ejaculations: the moral imperative for male contraceptive responsibility

Shahvisi

2020

J Med Ethics

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“…14 In response, Harry Silverstein noted a distinction between causing a person to exist and causing a person to need assistance given that he exists. 15 In the former case the cause of the person's existence is not obliged to meet his needs, whereas in the latter case she is. For example, suppose a physician could save someone's life, but only by giving him medication that would later have dangerous side effects.…”

Section: Natural Duties Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Only if the physician had had an alternative cure available, which did not have the side effects, would giving the original medication oblige her to treat its side effects. 16 Parents are in the first situation: they do not have the option of creating their child without needs. Consequently, qua cause of the child's neediness, they must at most provide for those needs whose existence they could have averted while still creating the child.…”

Section: Natural Duties Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Do We Acquire Parental Responsibilities?

Millum¹

2008

Social Theory and Practice

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“…1 Silverstein, and Boonin in his recent book, attack RO. 2 Each man provides a negative argument against grounds for RO. Each also provides a positive argument for the conclusion that even if a person has voluntary sex with the knowledge that a fetal person in need might result, and a fetal person in need does result, the person has no special obligation to provide aid to the fetal person.…”

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confidence: 99%

Life Extension and Creation: A Reply to Silverstein and Boonin

Hall¹

2004

Journal of Social Philosophy

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Thomson and those following her have famously argued that even if a fetus possessed a right to life comparable to that of a typical adult human being, many abortions would still be permissible.One important line of objection to the Thomson arguments is the Responsibility Objection (RO):Responsibility objection: If a person engages in voluntary sex with the knowledge that a fetal person in need of aid will, or might, result, and a fetal person in need of aid does result, the person has a special obligation to provide aid to the fetal person."Special obligation" here means an obligation attaching to the parents in particular, an obligation beyond that which any stranger would have for a person in need.RO does not necessarily make any claim that voluntary sex implies or constitutes tacit consent to provide aid. It might claim only that having voluntary sex with the knowledge that a fetus might result is sufficient to make one liable to provide aid if a fetus results. That is, it might claim that voluntary sex is akin to negligence in ordinary tort cases.RO is intuitively plausible. Certainly, it captures a widely and strongly held judgment about responsibility for the persons that result from voluntary sex, particularly in the case of fathers. Even if a father scrupulously uses birth control, and even if he in no way consents to the care of a child that accidentally results, the fact that the father engaged in voluntary sex with the knowledge that a needy person might result is sufficient reason, in the view of most people, to obligate the father to care for the child. 1 Silverstein, and Boonin in his recent book, attack RO. 2 Each man provides a negative argument against grounds for RO. Each also provides a positive argument for the conclusion that even if a person has voluntary sex with the knowledge that a fetal person in need might result, and a fetal person in need does result, the person has no special obligation to provide aid to the fetal person. Although the negative and positive arguments are similar, the positive arguments are intrinsically more interesting and make it easier to articulate my line of reply. So, I will be interested exclusively in the positive arguments in what follows. 3 Silverstein's and Boonin's positive arguments are also much alike, so I will consider them together, as a single argument.Their positive argument appeals to cases of the extension of the life of an existing person. These cases have an important feature in common with cases

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On a Woman’s “Responsibility” for the Fetus

Cited by 32 publications

References 0 publications

Towards responsible ejaculations: the moral imperative for male contraceptive responsibility

Towards responsible ejaculations: the moral imperative for male contraceptive responsibility

How Do We Acquire Parental Responsibilities?

Life Extension and Creation: A Reply to Silverstein and Boonin

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