Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary

Bozóki, András

doi:10.1080/0965156x.2012.703415

Cited by 37 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…All of these groups explicitly claim to challenge the corrupt elite and emerge from a more bottom-up form of populist mobilisation. This contrasts with the situation in Hungary and Russia, where incumbent leaders have played on fears of outsiders and promises to protect the integrity of the state (Bozóki, 2011;Smyth, Sobolev, & Soboleva, 2013). Comparing the situation in Europe with that in Latin America, Kaltwasser (2012, p. 199;also Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013) argues that while the populists in the latter are more inclusive, both 'show little respect for the rules of political competition … [as they] foster a moralization of politics'.…”

Section: Populism and Religion In Times Of Crisismentioning

confidence: 79%

Populism, protest and democracy in the twenty-first century

O’Brien

2015

Contemporary Social Science

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Protest is an important measure of discontent within society and can be seen as a form of politics by other means. In periods of uncertainty and instability, protest can harm incumbent regimes by heightening and amplifying tensions, potentially leading to crisis and collapse in extreme cases. The wave of democratisation that characterised the last quarter of the twentieth century saw a number of weak democracies emerge and struggle, whereas other regime changes saw new forms of authoritarianism emerge. Crises in the early twentyfirst century have shaken both democratic and non-democratic states, leading to large-scale 'occupy' movements and uprisings that have brought down regimes in the former Soviet Union and across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 1 region. Common to these diverse protests is a feeling of antipolitics that draws on populist and religious motivations to challenge the state. The aim of this paper is to consider the significance of this apparent wave of protest and identify the driving factors. In order to do this, the paper examines arguments around the quality of democracy (and autocracy), state-social movement interactions and the rise of populist and religious movements.

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Section: Populism and Religion In Times Of Crisismentioning

confidence: 79%

Populism, protest and democracy in the twenty-first century

O’Brien

2015

Contemporary Social Science

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“…Given the abundance of literature, it is not necessary to delve into the details of this grand institutional transformation (Boz oki, 2015;Kornai, 2015). Less institutionalized practices whereby prominent party loyalists were nominated to lead key checksand-balances institutions were another important vehicle of extending power (Boz oki, 2011;Enyedi, 2016;Rupnik, 2012). The transformation has affected most of the key economic sectors, the media landscape (Bogaards, 2018), civil society (Bartha et al, 2020), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and churches, as well as the cultural scene (see Nyikos and Talaga, 2014), too.…”

Section: The Recent Past: Illiberal Transformations In Hungary and Pomentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding drivers of illiberal entrenchment at critical junctures: institutional responses to COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland

Hajnal

Jeziorska

Kovács

2021

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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The present article aims to improve understanding of institution formation in (former) liberal-democratic polities characterized by autocratization tendencies. We examine how the critical juncture created by the COVID-19 pandemic was used, as well as the interplay between antecedent, structural conditions and the particular combinations of political agency and contingency. By comparing the two similar cases of Hungary and Poland – the two European Union countries that have progressed the farthest towards illiberal transformation – and using documentary and interview evidence, we conclude that: (1) whereas Hungary exhibited significant institutional changes, Poland did not; (2) these differences in institutional outcomes can be significantly attributed to differences in certain critical antecedent conditions; and (3) the ability of key political actors – Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Poland’s Jarosław Kaczyński – to control their own political camp seems to have exerted an unmistakable effect as well. Points for practitioners The build-up and entrenchment of institutions of illiberal rule in (previously) liberal-democratic contexts are encumbered by diverse political and institutional constraints. External shocks, such as the COVID-19 crisis, may offer an opportunity to bypass those constraints and to change institutions permanently. Our study concludes that the extent to which such historical windows of opportunity can indeed be used to achieve lasting institutional changes depends not only on the objective, historically given political and institutional constraints that illiberal reforms face, but also on their subjective ability to act in a controlled, coordinated and coherent manner.

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“…Centralization of governmental control over the state bureaucracy also involved political appointments to key public positions. Thus, a former Fidesz member of the parliament has become President of the Media Authority, while the spouse of a prominent Fidesz Member of European Parliament (MEP) became Head of the National Judicial Office (Bozóki, 2011).…”

Section: Economization Of the Politicalmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Makes Authoritarian Capitalism Authoritarian? The Double Erosion of the Private-public Divide in Illiberal Hungary

Sallai

Schnyder

2019

SSRN Journal

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For several decades, the Business and Society literature has mainly focused on the retreat of the state from the economy in Western countries since the 1980s. As a result, the "return of the state" as an economic actor, especially in emerging markets, has left scholars without the necessary tools to capture this trend of the "politicization of the economic." Thus, we argue that current conceptualizations of state-dominated systems as "authoritarian capitalism" too easily lump together countries as diverse as China, Singapore, and Norway under this heading. Rather than considering any type of state intervention in the economy as authoritarian, we propose a more sophisticated conceptualization of the extension of the political into the economic, which allows us to clearly distinguish cases of "state capitalism" from "authoritarian capitalism." We apply our framework to the case of Hungary to illustrate that a more precise definition of "authoritarian capitalism" makes it a useful tool to understand contexts beyond the Chinese case in which it first emerged. Based on interviews with business leaders in Hungary under Viktor Orbán's government, we identify the mechanisms by which an authoritarian government expands the political into the economic realm, eroding the publicprivate divide; moving thus from "democratic backsliding" into "economic backsliding."

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Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary

Cited by 37 publications

References 0 publications

Populism, protest and democracy in the twenty-first century

Populism, protest and democracy in the twenty-first century

Understanding drivers of illiberal entrenchment at critical junctures: institutional responses to COVID-19 in Hungary and Poland

What Makes Authoritarian Capitalism Authoritarian? The Double Erosion of the Private-public Divide in Illiberal Hungary

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