Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games

Abstract

Laws express rules of conduct ('obligations') enforced by the means of penalties and rewards ('incentives'). The role of incentives in shaping individual behaviour has been largely analysed in the traditional economic literature. On the contrary, very little is known about the specific role of obligations. In this paper we test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in a public good game. The results show that, for given marginal incentives, different levels of minimum contribution required by obligation determine significantly different levels of average contributions. Moreover, obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time, even if they affect the rate of decline of average contributions. Finally, unexpected changes in the minimum contribution have asymmetric dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the descending trend of cooperation, whereas an increase induces a temporary re-start in average contributions.JEL classification: C91; C92; H26; H41; K40

Human Prosocial Motivation and the Maintenance of Social Order

“…For example, people donate anonymously to charities (Eckel and Grossman 1996), they vote for reasons of civic duty, despite their vote being extremely unlikely pivotal (Riker and Ordeshook 1968); they respect the law (Cooter 2000) also if incentives that back up the obligations are weak (Galbiati and Vertova 2008). People pay their taxes despite low detection probabilities for evasion (Kirchler 2007), and people also care for the environment out of moral convictions (Brekke, Kipperberg, and Nyborg 2010 interesting field study) and also act on perceived moral obligations (Schwartz 1977).…”

Mandatory Minimum Contributions, Heterogenous Endowments and Voluntary Public-Good Provision

“…Despite the fact that in our experimental game there are no standard economic incentives for contributions above the compulsory minimum values, we expect our different minimum contribution schemes to exert expressive power (e.g., Cooter, 1998;Galbiati and Vertova, 2008), while driving contributions beyond the enforced minima due to incomplete crowding-out (Andreoni, 1993). Thereby, we anticipate that the miscellaneous schedules differently affect the sense of justice and the willingness to contribute among the group members.…”

“…The first is derived from the literature on expressive law that hypothesizes that obligations have a potential to influence behavior. They may create focal points or norms, which channel individuals' beliefs about the behavior of others and act as coordination devices (Cooter, 1998;Galbiati and Vertova, 2008;McAdams and Nadler, 2005). Rational individuals internalize a norm (i.e., change their behavior) when commitment promises an advantage (Cooter, 1998).…”

“…In other words, actors might view an obligation as an internal value. Law can thus create a focal point by creating values (e.g., Cooter, 1998;Galbiati and Vertova, 2008). The second literature strand deals with the impact of external interventions on intrinsic motivation with respect to crowding-out or crowding-in (e.g., Deci et al, 1999).…”

Lois et normes : les enseignements de l’économie comportementale

“…En un sens, l'obligation n'est qu'implicite en ce qu'elle découle de l'introduction d'une sanction pour défaut de contribution. Galbiati et Vertova (2008) présentent une expérience permettant d'identifier l'effectivité de l'obligation par elle-même, laquelle est explicitement décrite comme « contribution minimale requise », indépendamment du régime de sanction. Le régime de sanction est lui-même explicitement défini en fonction d'une vérification ou audit stochastique de la conformité de la contribution effective à l'obligation.…”