Nutzerfinanzierung öffentlicher Aufgaben – Stand und Perspektiven des Entgeltstaates

Gawel, Erik

doi:10.3790/verw.47.4.467

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 3 publications

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“…can guarantee an effective link between the public sector to citizens' preferences (Brennan/Buchanan 2006). The current crisis of the tax state clearly points to a spectacular failure of democratic control: The secular expansion of spending in order to serve particularist interests along with the concurrent de-coupling of revenue procurement, increasingly through public debt has -despite or precisely because of democratic control -just led to a financial, debt and acceptance crisis of the tax state, as can now be observed (Gawel 2012). If public tasks are financed through the national budget, citizens get the impression that they can use a motorway, tunnel or other infrastructure "free of charge" while the "state" courteously pays the bill (fiscal illusion).…”

Section: The Problem Of Controlmentioning

confidence: 96%

Political drivers of and barriers to Public-Private Partnerships – The role of political involvement

Gawel¹

2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: The application and design of public-private partnerships between the extremes of purely public or purely private task fulfilment in public services is, in practice, subject to political processes. Decisions about PPPs (realisation, arrangement) are taken in the political arena and are therefore not theoretical optimisation exercises. The interests and resources of the actors who participate in the political decision-making process as well as the rules of the political process have a powerful influence on whether, in what areas, and in what form PPPs are realised. The distance between this output and solutions that are theoretically desirable given certain ideal goals (e.g. efficiency) and conditions can be referred to as political bias. So what role does the political process play in the realisation of PPPs, in the actual design of PPPs, and in their performance? Using public choice and institutional economics theory this paper analyses what chances of success PPPs have given the existing decision-making structures and the inherent incentives for participating actors, and in what way political influence is brought to bear in the first place. Furthermore, aspects of political science in this field (legitimacy, democratic control) are considered as well. Using PPPs there might be a trade-off between reduced democratic control, but also reinforced market control. It turns out that political involvement might be both an important driver as well as an obstacle for (efficient) PPPs and that it is likely to decrease efficiency either way. A case study for userfinancing PPPs in the transport sector highlights the problems of political renitency. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: The Problem Of Controlmentioning

confidence: 96%