Nuclear Policy and Regulation in Japan after Fukushima: Navigating the Crisis

Abstract

The aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl, has seen a public debate emerge over the future desirability of nuclear power in Japan. While Japanese citizens' suspicion of nuclear power has grown, the nuclear industry and electricity utilities have called on the central government to recommission the country's reactors amid warnings of devastation for the Japanese economy. This article analyses nuclear policy-making in Japan in the aftermath of Fukushima, with the aim to identify key theoretical, institutional and organisational drivers and constraints to future change in Japan's nuclear energy policy. Despite the growing anti-nuclear sentiment and concerns about the environmental risks of nuclear power, we contend that the continuing power of vested interests will make it difficult for Japan to completely abandon nuclear power during the course of the next decade. However, given the independence of the newly established nuclear regulator and the fact that an effective veto power is held by local government officials, some of whom are opposed to the recommissioning of nuclear plants in their prefectures, we argue that the nuclear policy and regulatory landscape in Japan will undergo moderate change.

Uncovering regime resistance in energy transition: Role of electricity iron triangle in Taiwan

“…That is, a policy apparatus for incumbency is emerging which strengthens the position of traditional energy while offsetting the possibility of policy reform ( Johnstone et al, 2017), thus keeping policy innovation on a leash (Smink et al, 2015). 3 Similarly, a related strand of research has proposed that the nuclear infrastructure and accompanying power sectors still have had a significant impact on Japan's green transition after the Fukushima disaster (Kikuchi, ; Sklarew, 2018, p. 158; Vivoda & Graetz, 2015).…”

Changing dynamics of the nuclear energy policy‐making process in Japan

“…These cases indicate the gradually changing nature of judicial involvement in nuclear power plant safety issues. Courts are becoming more actively involved in safety issues, especially in issuing injunctions or suspensions, asking both the government (ministries and independent regulatory agencies) and power companies to reconsider possible safety concerns (Murphy, 2014; Vivoda & Graetz, 2015). This is particularly evident in the Hiroshima high court decision to suspend the Ikata plant for 9 months.…”

“…After the Fukushima crisis, both the judicial branch and local governments became more independent and influential actors in the nuclear energy policy‐making process (Aldrich & Fraser, 2017; Murphy, 2014; Vivoda & Graetz, 2015). In 2014, Kansai Electric Power Company applied to resume operation of two reactors at the Ooi Nuclear Power Plant but met strong protests; the Fukui local court granted an injunction against resuming operation.…”

Measuring CSR Disclosure when Assessing Stock Market Effects

“…A major earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011 led to explosions and a partial nuclear meltdown at Tokyo Electric Power's (TEPCO) Fukushima nuclear power plant in Northeast Japan. Within days of the incident, more than 200,000 people had to be evacuated from the region due to concerns with radiation leakage, and the event triggered renewed questions on the safety of nuclear power generation (Hayashi and Hughes 2013;Vivoda and Graetz 2015). Early studies of the market impact of the disaster (e.g., Ferstl et al 2012;Kawashima and Takeda 2012;Betzer et al 2013) document significant negative reactions for Japanese, French, and German utility companies with nuclear operations, but none explores the role that CSR disclosure may have played in these reactions.…”