Not the optimistic type

Abstract

In recent work, Peter Hanks and Scott Soames argue for the type view, according to which propositions are types whose tokens are acts, states, or events. Hanks and Soames think that one of the virtues of the type view is that it allows them to explain why propositions have semantic properties. But, in this paper, we argue that their explanations aren't satisfactory.

‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force

“…true or false? (see [Caplan et al 2014]. ) If they are, do they exist independently of mental and speech acts?…”

Grasping a Proposition and Cancellation

“…So, why does the property of being judgemental transfer from token-acts of predication to their types? See Caplan et al (2013) and Speaks (2014). See also Hanks (2015, pp.…”

Act‐type theories of propositions

“…28 28 I take this example from Caplan, Tillman, McLean, & Murray's counterexample to what they call ‘Universal Inheritance’ (Caplan et al., 2013, pp. 578–579). …”

“…29 29 This objection is made against both Hanks’ and Soames’ versions of the act‐type theory in Caplan et al. (2013), and is also made against Soames’ version specifically by King, and by Speaks, who attributes it to Caplan (King et al., 2014, pp. 136–137, 164–165).…”