‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force

Textor, Mark

doi:10.1080/00048402.2020.1742748

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…This is neither to say that an attitude cannot come unbound to a content, nor that a content cannot come unbound to an attitude. As illustrations of these possibilities, we may think of moods as contentless affective attitudes and of situations where we merely entertain a content as "attitudeless" (on this latter controversial idea, see Textor, 2021).…”

Section: Attitudinal Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory identification and its failures

Teroni

2024

PhiMiSci

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When we remember, we often know that we do. How does this memory identification proceed? After having articulated some constraints on an attractive account of memory identification, this paper explores three types of accounts that respectively appeal to features of memory content, of memory as an activity, and of memory as an attitude. It offers reasons to favour an attitudinal account giving pride of place to the feeling of familiarity.

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Section: Attitudinal Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Memory identification and its failures

Teroni

2024

PhiMiSci

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“…Hanks (2007b) argues against the context–force distinction. Textor (2021) defends Frege’s distinction. Schwartz and Hom (2021) raise an objection to Hanks’ version of the act‐type theory related to the content–force distinction.…”

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confidence: 99%

Act‐type theories of propositions

Hodgson

2021

Philosophy Compass

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Many philosophers believe in things, propositions, which are the things that we believe, assert etc., and which are the contents of sentences. The act‐type theory of propositions is an attempt to say what propositions are, to explain how we stand in relations to them, and to explain why they are true or false. The core idea of the act‐type theory is that propositions are types of acts of predication. The theory is developed in various ways to offer explanations of the important properties of propositions. I present the core idea of the theory, and some developments of it. I discuss the relationship between the theory and the content–force distinction. I also present an important type of objection that has been raised to the explanations offered by the act‐type theory.

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‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force

Cited by 2 publications

References 20 publications

Memory identification and its failures

Memory identification and its failures

Act‐type theories of propositions

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